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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on
the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a
Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance
on performance pay and other high-powered incentives, thereby shifting e¤ort away from less easily
contractible tasks such as long-term investments, risk management and within-rm cooperation.
Under perfect competition, the resulting e¢ ciency loss can be much larger than that imposed by a
single rm or principal, who distorts incentives downward in order to extract rents. More generally,
as declining market frictions lead employers to compete more aggressively, the monopsonistic un-
derincentivization of low-skill agents rst decreases, then gives way to a growing overincentivization
of high-skill ones. Aggregate welfare is thus hill-shaped with respect to the competitiveness of the
labor market, while inequality tends to rise monotonically. Bonus caps and income taxes can help
restore balance in agentsincentives and behavior, but may generate their own set of distortions.
Keywords: incentives, performance pay, bonuses, executive compensation, inequality, multitask,
contracts, screening, adverse selection, moral hazard, work ethic, Hotelling, competition.
JEL Classication: D31, D82, D86, J31, J33, L13, M12
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a literal explosion of pay, both in levels and in di¤erentials, at the top
echelons of many occupations. Large bonuses and salaries are needed, it is typically said, to retain
talentand top performersin nance, corporations, medicine, academia, as well as to incentivize
them to perform to the best of their high abilities. Paradoxically, this trend has been accompanied
by mounting revelations of poor actual performance, severe moral hazard and even outright fraud
in those same sectors. Oftentimes these behaviors impose negative spillovers on the rest of society
(e.g., bank bailouts), but even when not, the rms involved themselves ultimately su¤er: large
trading losses, declines in stock value, loss of reputation and consumer goodwill, regulatory nes
and legal liabilities, or even bankruptcy.
This paper proposes a resolution of the puzzle, by showing how competition for the most
productive workers can interact with the incentive structure inside rms to undermine work ethics
the extent to which agents do the right thingbeyond what their material self-interest commands.
More generally, the underlying idea is that highly competitive labor markets make it di¢ cult for
employers to strike the proper balance between the benets and costs of high-powered incentives.
The result is a bonus culture that takes over the workplace, generating distorted decisions and
signicant e¢ ciency losses, particularly in the long run. To make this point we develop a model that
combines multitasking, screening and imperfect competition, making a methodological contribution
in the process.
Inside each rm, agents perform both a task that is easily measured (sales, output, trading
prots, billable medical procedures) and one that is not and therefore involves an element of public-
goods provision (intangible investments a¤ecting long-run value, nancial or legal risk-taking, co-
operation among individuals or divisions). Agents potentially di¤er in their productivity for the
rewardable task and in their intrinsic willingness to provide the unrewarded one their work ethic.
When types are observable, the standard result applies: principals set relatively low-powered in-
centives that optimally balance workers e¤ort allocation; competition then only a¤ects the size
of xed compensation. Things change fundamentally when skill levels are unobservable, leading
rms to o¤er contracts designed to screen di¤erent types of workers. A single principal (monop-
sonist, collusive industry) sets the power of incentives even lower than the social optimum, so as
to extract rents from the more productive agents. Labor-market competition, however, introduces
a new role for performance pay: because it is di¤erentially attractive to more productive workers,
it also serves as a device which rms use to attract (or retain) these types. Focusing rst on the
limiting case of perfect competition, we show that the degree of incentivization is always above the
social optimum, and identify a simple condition under which the resulting distortion exceeds that
occurring under monopsony. Competitive bidding for talent is thus destructive of work ethics, and
ultimately welfare-reducing.
We then develop a Hotelling-like variant of competitive screening to analyze the equilibrium
contracts under arbitrary degrees of imperfect competition. As mobility costs (or horizontal di¤er-
entiation) decline, the monopsonistic underincentivization of low-skill agents gradually decreases,
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then at some point gives way to a growing overincentivization of high-skill ones. Aggregate welfare
is thus hill-shaped with respect to competition, while comprehensive measures of inequality (gaps
in utility or total earnings) tend to rise monotonically. This leads us to analyze di¤erent policies,
such as bonus caps or taxes on total compensation, that can potentially improve e¢ ciency and
restore balance in agents incentives and focus. The extent to which this is achievable depends
on how well the government or regulator is able to distinguish the incentive versus xed parts of
compensation packages, as well as on the distortions that may arise as rms try to blur that line
or resort to even less e¢ cient screening devices.
In our baseline model, one task is unobservable or noncontractible, and thus performed solely
out of intrinsic motivation. This (standard) specication of the multitask problem is convenient,
but inessential for the main results. We thus extend the analysis to the case where performance
in both tasks is measurable and hence rewarded, but noisy, which limits the power of incentives
(e.g., deferred compensation versus yearly bonuses) given to risk averse agents. This not only
demonstrates robustness (no reliance on intrinsic motivation) but also yields a new set of results
that bring to light how the distorted incentive structure under competition (or monopsony) and
the resulting misallocation of e¤ort are shaped by the measurement noise in each task, agents
comparative advantage across them, and risk aversion.
Finally, we contrast our main analysis of competition for talent with the polar case where agents
have the same productivity in the measurable task but di¤er in their ethical motivation for the
unmeasurable one. In this case, competition is shown to be either benecial (reducing the overin-
centivization which a monopsonist uses to extract rent, but never causing underincentivization), or
neutral as occurs in a variant of the model where ethical motivation generates positive spillovers
inside the rm instead of private benets for the agent.
The rest of this section discusses empirical evidence and related literature. Section 2 presents
the basic model. Section 3 analyzes equilibrium under varying degrees of competition, and Section 4
the e¤ects of pay regulation. Section 5 allows both tasks to be observable, while Section 6 considers
heterogeneity in motivation rather than ability. Section 7 concludes. The main proofs are gathered
in Appendices A to C, more technical ones in the online supplementary Appendix D.
1.1 Evidence
Although bankersbonuses and CEO pay packages attract the most attention, the parallel rise in
incentive pay and earnings inequality is a much broader phenomenon, as established by Lemieux
et al. (2009). Between the late 1970s and the 1990s, the fraction of jobs explicitly paid based on
performance rose from 38% to 45%. Further compounding the direct impact on inequality is the
fact that the returns to skills, both observable (education, experience, job tenure) and unobservable,
are much higher in such jobs. This last nding also suggests that di¤erent compensation structures
may play an important sorting role.1 Lemieux et al. calculate that the interaction of structural
1Consistent with this view and with our modelling premise that performance incentives a¤ect not only moral
hazard (e.g. Bandiera et al. 2007, Shearer 2004) but also selection, Lazears (2000) study of Safelite Glass Company
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change and di¤erential returns account for 21% of the growth in the variance of male log-wages
over the period, and for essentially 100% (or even more) above the 80th percentile.
The source of escalation in incentive pay in our model is increased competition for the best
workers, and this also ts well with the evidence on managerial compensation in advanced countries.
In a long-term study (1936-2003) of the market for top US executives, Frydman (2007) documents
a major shift, starting in the 1970s and sharply accelerating since the late 1980s, from rm-specic
skills to more general managerial ones e.g., from engineering degrees to MBAs. In addition, there
has been a concomitant rise in the diversity of sectoral experiences acquired over the course of a
typical career. Frydman argues that these decreases in mobility costs have intensied competition
for managerial skills and shows that, consistent with this view, executives with higher general
(multipurpose) human capital received higher compensation and were also the most likely to switch
companies. Using panel data on the 500 largest rms in Germany over 1977-2009, Fabbri and Marin
(2011) show that domestic and (to a lesser extent) global competition for managers has contributed
signicantly to the rise of executive pay in that country, particularly in the banking sector.
Our theory is based on competition not simply bidding up the level of compensation at the top,
but also signicantly altering its structure toward high-powered incentives, with a resulting shift
in the mix of tasks performed toward more easily quantiable and short-term-oriented ones. This
seems to be precisely what occurred on Wall Street as market-based compensation spread from the
emerging alternative-assets industry to the rest of the nancial world:
Talent quickly migrated from investment banks to hedge funds and private equity.
Investment banks, accustomed to attracting the most-talented executives in the world
and paying them handsomely, found themselves losing their best people (and their best
MBA recruits) to higher-paid and, for many, more interesting jobs... Observing the re-
markable compensation in alternative assets, sensing a signicant business opportunity,
and having to ght for talent with this emergent industry led banks to venture into
proprietary activities in unprecedented ways. From 1998 to 2006 principal and pro-
prietary trading at major investment banks grew from below 20% of revenues to 45%.
In a 2006 Investment DealersDigest article... one former Morgan Stanley executive
said... that extravagant hedge fund compensation widely envied on Wall Street, ac-
cording to many bankerswas putting upward pressure on investment banking pay, and
that some prop desks were even beginning to give traders "carry." Banks bought hedge
funds and private equity funds and launched their own funds, creating new levels of risk
within systemically important institutions and new conicts of interest. By 2007 the
transformation of Wall Street was complete. Faced with erce new rivals for business
and talent, investment banks turned into risk takers that compensated their best and
brightest with contracts embodying the essence of nancial-markets-based compensa-
tion.(Desai 2012, The Incentive Bubble).
found that half of the 44% productivity increase reaped when the company replaced the hourly wage system by a
piece rate was due to in- and out-selection e¤ects.
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Similar transformations have occurred in the medical world with the rise of for-prot hospital
chains: Gawande (2009) documents the escalation of compensation driven by the overuse of revenue-
generating tests and surgeries, with parallel declines in preventive care and coordination on cases
between specialists, increases in costs and worse patient outcomes.
1.2 Related Literature
 Adverse selection. Our paper relates to and extends several lines of work. The rst one is that
on screening with exclusive contracts, initiated by Rothschild and Stiglitzs (1976) seminal study
of a perfectly competitive (free entry) insurance market. Croker and Snow (1985) characterize
the Pareto frontier for the two types in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model and show how it ranges
from suboptimal insurance for the safer type (as in the original separating equilibrium) to over-
insurance for the risky type. Stewart (1994) and Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) study perfectly
competitive insurance markets with adverse selection and moral hazard: agents can exert risk-
reducing e¤orts, at some privately known cost. In equilibrium the better agents choose contracts
with higher deductibles, for which they substitute higher precautionary e¤ort.2 ;3 Moen and Rosen
(2005) consider a perfectly competitive labor market with adverse selection about workerse¤ort
cost function. As in Baker (1992), true output is mismeasured by the employer and subject to a
productivity shock, which agents learn prior to choosing e¤ort. Focusing on a¢ ne contracts leads
to a separating equilibrium in which high types are overincentivized relative to the social optimum,
and thus bear too much risk; progressive taxes can ameliorate this distortion.4
Our paper extends the literature by analyzing screening in a multitask environment and by
deriving equilibrium and welfare for the whole range of competition intensities between the polar
cases of monopsony and perfect competition, which most previous work has focused on comparing
to the rst-best. A notable exception to the latter point is Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999),
who study Hotelling competition between banks that screen credit risks through costly collateral
requirements. As product di¤erentiation declines lenders compete more aggressively for the most
protable borrowers, and the resulting increase in screening costs (collateral posted) can be such
that overall welfare falls. Banksproblem is one of pure adverse selection, whereas in our context
there is also (multidimensional) moral hazard. We thus analyze how the structure of wage contracts,
e¤ort allocations, earnings and welfare vary with market frictions. We characterize the socially
optimal degree of competitiveness and derive the models predictions for changes in total pay
inequality and its performance-based component, which accord well with the empirical evidence
discussed earlier.
2Scheuer and Netzer (2010) contrast this benecial incentive e¤ect of private insurance markets to a benevolent
government without commitment power, which would provide full insurance at the interim stage (once e¤orts have
been chosen) and thereby destroy any ex-ante incentive for e¤ort.
3Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) study price discrimination in private-value models
where, in contrast with the present work, principals do not directly care about agentstypes but are purely concerned
with rent extraction. Vega and Weyl (2012) study product design when consumer heterogeneity is of high dimension
relative to rmschoice variables, which allows for both cream-skimming and rent-extraction to occur in equilibrium.
4Allowing nonlinear contracts leads to a somewhat weaker result, namely that the rst-best cannot be attained.
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Most recently, Bannier et al. (2013) study competition for risk-averse employees with di¤erent
abilities between two vertically di¤erentiated single-task rms. A workers output is the product of
his and the rms productivities, his e¤ort and a random shock. In equilibrium, the low-productivity
rm does not employ anyone, but its o¤er denes workers reservation utilities. The degree of
competition is represented here by the relative productivity of the less e¢ cient rm; as in our
case, its impact on screening results in a hump-shaped prole for welfare. We focus on horizontal
rm di¤erentiation and our multitask model incorporates distortions to e¤ort allocation (short-
termism, hidden risk, etc.), which can arise even absent risk-sharing concerns. Besides hurting
the rms these may also have important externalities on the rest of society, since what is hard
to observe by employers is a fortiori di¢ cult to monitor by regulators. We further analyze how
competition a¤ects the level and structure of earnings inequality and derive from these positive
results a simple test of whether it lies in the benecial or harmful range. In the latter case, we also
study the regulation or taxation of bonuses and total pay.5
 Multitasking. From the multitask literature we borrow and build on the idea that incentivizing
easily measurable tasks can jeopardize the provision of e¤ort on less measurable ones (e.g. Holm-
ström and Milgrom 1991, Itoh 1991, Baker at al. 1994, Dewatripont et al. 1999, Fehr and Schmidt
2004). Somewhat surprisingly, the impact of competition on the multitasking problem has not
attracted much attention a fortiori not in combination with adverse selection.6 As in earlier work,
employers in our model choose ( linear or nonlinear) compensation structures aiming to balance
incentives, but the desire to extract rents or the need to select the best employees lead them to o¤er
socially distorted compensation schemes. In relatively competitive labor markets, in particular, a
rm raising its performance-based pay exerts a negative externality: it fails to internalize the fact
that competitors, in order to retain their own talent, will also have to distort their incentive
structure and e¤ort allocation, thereby reducing the total surplus generated by their workforce.
Tymula (2012) studies a teamwork problem in which a workers output depends on both his own
selsh e¤ort and his partners helping e¤ort, each augmented by the respective agents productivity;
unlike here, there is no substitutability between e¤orts. Both individual and team output are
observable, and thus rewarded by employers, which compete under free entry by each o¤ering a
single linear contract. The equilibrium is separating and characterized by assortative matching,
which prevents low types from free-riding on high ones. To achieve separation, high types are
overincentivized on both tasks relative to the rst-best, so they work harder not only on their own
project but also on helping their teammate. By contrast, we predict underinvestment in the second
5Stantcheva (2012) studies optimal income taxation when perfectly competitive rms use work hours to screen
for workersproductivity. Welfare can then be higher when agentstypes are unknown to employers, as the need to
signal talent counteracts the Mirrleesian incentive to underproduce. The contrast in results arises from rms and
the state being able to observe labor inputs, whereas in our context only output is observable (were it measurable in
Stantchevas single-task model, screening would yield the rst best).
6Acemoglu et al. (2007) show how career concerns can lead workers to engage in excessive signaling to prospective
employers, by exerting e¤ort on both a productive task and an unproductive one that makes performance appear
better than it really is. Firms could temper career incentives by organizing production according to teamwork, which
generates coarser public signals of individual abilities, but the required commitment to team-based compensation
fails to be credible when individual performance can still be observed inside the partnership.
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(less easily measurable) task at high enough levels of competition, even when it can be incentivized.
 Managerial compensation. While our paper is not specically about executive pay, this is an
important application of the model. The literature on managerial compensation is usually seen as
organized along two contrasting lines (see, e.g., Frydman and Jenter (2010) for a recent survey). On
one hand is the view that high executive rewards reect a high demand for rare skills (Rosen 1981)
and the e¢ cient workings of a competitive market allocating talent to where it is most productive,
for instance to manage larger rms (Gabaix and Landier 2008). Rising pay at the top is then
simply the appropriate price response to market trends favoring the best workers: skilled-biased
technical change, improvements in monitoring, growth in the size of rms, entry or decreases in
mobility costs.
On the other side is the view that the level and structure of managerial compensation reect
instead signicant market failures. For instance, indolent or captured boards may grant top ex-
ecutives pay packages far in excess of their marginal product (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001,
Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Alternatively, managers are given incentive schemes that do maximize
prots but impose signicant negative externalities on the rest of society by inducing excessive short-
termism and risk-taking at the expense of consumers, depositors or taxpayers public bailouts and
environmental cleanups, tax arbitrage, etc. (e.g., Bolton et al. 2006, Besley and Ghatak 2011). In
particular, private returns in the nance industry are often argued to exceed social returns (Baumol
1990, Philippon and Reshef 2012).
Our paper takes on board the rst views premise that pay levels and di¤erentials largely reect
market returns to both talent and measured performance, magnied in recent decades by technical
change and increased mobility. At the same time, and closer in that to the second view, we show
that this very same escalation of performance-based pay can be the source of severe distortions and
long-run welfare losses in the sectors where it occurs even absent any externalities on the rest of
society, and a fortiori in their presence.
The idea that labor market pressure will force rms to alter the structure of contracts they o¤er
to managers is shared with a few other recent papers.7 In Marin and Verdier (2009), international
trade integration leads new entrants to compete with incumbents for managerial talent required to
operate a rm; within each rm principals also nd it increasingly optimal to delegate decision-
making to middle-management, further raising the demand for skilled labor. The papersfocus and
mechanism are very di¤erent from ours, however. Agents receive no monetary incentives but derive
private benets from delegation, and those rents are non-monotonic with respect to competition.
Furthermore, equilibrium changes in organizational design and activities performed tend to be ef-
cient responses to relative factor endowments. In Acharya et al. (2011), rms can use two types
of incentives: a reward in case of success, and making it hard to resist a takeover with its ensuing
loss of private benetsin case of failure (strong governance). Managers with high skills (which
are observable) are in short supply, so in equilibrium they appropriate all the rents they generate.
7There is also an earlier literature examining the (generally ambiguous) e¤ects of product market competition
on managerial incentives and slack, whether through information revelation (Holmström 1982, Nalebu¤ and Stglitz
1983) or demand elasticities and the level of prots (Schmidt 1997, Raith 2003).
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This forces their employers to renounce the threat of takeovers (weak governance), whereas rms
employing the more abundant low-skill managers can still avail themselves of it. In contrast to our
model, competition weakens here certain forms of incentives (dismissal for failure) while strength-
ening others (reward for success). Most importantly, rmsgovernance choices, and therefore also
the competitiveness of the labor market, have no allocative impact: they only redistribute a xed
surplus between managers, shareholders and potential raiders.8 In Acharya et al. (2012), labor
market competition interferes with the process of learning about agentsabilities. A manager can
invest in a safe asset or in a risky one whose return depends on his ability but will be observable
(to the rm and others) only if he remains in charge of it, with the same employer, for two periods.
There are no bonuses, so incentives are implicit (career concern) ones. Absent mobility, rms can
commit ex-ante to paying everyone the same lifetime wage, thus insuring managers against the risk
of being of low ability; this also makes it optimal to quickly nd out ones talent, so as to choose
the type of project one is better suited to. With free mobility, managers who stayed in a rm
long enough to be revealed as talented would be bid away by competitors; such insurance is thus
precluded, as in Harris and Holmström (1982). Instead, during the early stages of their careers
everyone moves to a di¤erent rm in every period so as to delay learning, and in these short-term
jobs all managers ine¢ ciently select the risky investment.
 Intrinsic motivation. Finally, a recent literature incorporates considerations of intrinsic motiva-
tion and crowding out (Bénabou and Tirole 2003, 2006) into compensation design and labor-market
sorting. Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2006) nd conditions under which agents who derive private
benets from working in mission-oriented sectors will match assortatively with such rms, where
they receive low pay but exert substantial e¤ort. Focusing on civil-service jobs, Prendergast (2007)
shows how it can be optimal to select employees who are either in empathy with their clients
(teachers, social workers, reghters) or somewhat hostile to them (police o¢ cers, tax or customs
inspectors). When the state has imperfect information about agents types, however, it is gen-
erally not feasible to induce proper self-selection into jobs. Most closely related to our work in
this literature is the multitask model of Kosfeld and von Siemens (2011), in which workers di¤er
in their social preferences rather than productivity: some are purely self-interested, others con-
ditional cooperators. Competition among employers leads to agentssorting themselves between
selsh jobs, which involve high bonuses but no cooperation among coworkers and thus attract
only selsh types, and cooperative jobs characterized by muted incentives and cooperative be-
havior, which are populated by conditional cooperators. Notably, positive prots emerge despite
perfect competition. Because the source of heterogeneity is di¤erent from the main one emphasized
in our paper, it is not surprising that the issue of excessive incentive pay does not arise in theirs.
8 In Thanassoulis (2013), competition also works by raising managerial rents (there is no ex-ante adverse selection,
hence no designing of contracts to attract or retain talent): the disutility of e¤ort increases through an income e¤ect,
requiring stronger incentives. If deferred compensation is more expensive to provide than short-term bonuses due to
managersimpatience, rms will use more of the latter, resulting in excessively myopic decisions.
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2 Model
2.1 Agents
 Preferences. A unit continuum of agents (workers) engage in two activities A and B, exerting
e¤orts (a; b) 2 R2+ respectively:
 Activity A is one in which individual contributions are not (easily) measurable and thus
cannot be part of a formal compensation scheme: long-term investments enhancing the rms
value, avoiding excessive risks and liabilities, cooperation, teamwork , etc. An agents contribution
to A is then driven entirely by his intrinsic motivation, va, linear in the e¤ort a exerted in this
task. In addition to a genuine preference to do the right thing (e.g., an aversion to ripping
o¤ shareholders or customers, selling harmful products, teaching shoddily, etc.), v can also reect
social and self-image concerns such as fear of stigma, or an executives concern for his legacy.9
In some contexts it can also capture outside incentives not controlled by the rm, such as potential
legal liability.
Activity B; by contrast, is measurable and therefore contractible: individual output, sales,
short-term revenue, etc. When exerting e¤ort b; a workers productivity is + b, where  is a talent
parameter, privately known to each agent.10
The total e¤ort cost, C(a; b); is strictly increasing and strictly convex in (a; b); with Cab > 0
unless otherwise noted, meaning that the two activities are substitutes. A particularly convenient
specication is the quadratic one, C(a; b) = a2=2 + b2=2 + ab; where 0 <  < 1; as it allows for
simple and explicit analytical solutions to the whole model.11 These are provided in Appendix
A; whereas in the text we shall maintain a general cost function, except where needed to obtain
further results.
We assume an a¢ ne compensation scheme with incentive power or bonus rate y and xed wage
z; so that total compensation is ( + b)y + z:12 Agents have quasi-linear preferences
U(a; b; ; y; z) = va+ ( + b) y + z   C(a; b): (1)
 Types. To emphasize the roles of heterogeneity in v and , respectively, we shall focus on two polar
cases. Here and throughout Section 3, agents di¤er only in their productivities. Thus  2 fL, Hg;
9Such preferences leading agents to provide some level of unrewarded e¤ort were part of Milgrom and Holmströms
original multitasking model (1991, Section 3). They make the analysis most tractable, but Section 5 derives similar
results when performance in both tasks is incentivized but A is measured with more noise than B (or/and less
discriminating of worker talent). For recent analyzes of intrinsic motivation and social norms see, e.g., Bénabou and
Tirole (2003, 2006) and Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2006). In the context of rms, see Akerlof and Kranton (2005) for
evidence and Ramalingam and Rauh (2010) for a model of investment in employeesloyalty and identication.
10The additive form of talent heterogeneity is chosen for analytical simplicity, as it implies that the rst best power
of incentive is type-independent. Qualitatively similar results would obtain with the multiplicative form b; as long
as type heterogeneity in  is not so high that the rst-best set of contracts becomes incentive-compatible.
11 The model also works when the two tasks are complements; Cab < 0 (e.g.,  1 <  < 0) but the results in this
case are less interesting, e.g., competition is now, predictably, always more e¢ cient than monopsony.
12Unrestricted nonlinear schemes (as in La¤ont and Tirole 1986) lead to very similar results; see Appendix B and
the propositions therein.
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with respective probabilities (qL; 1  qL = qH) and   H   L > 0: In Section 6, conversely, we
shall consider agents who di¤er only in their intrinsic motivations v for task A:
 E¤ort allocation. When facing compensation scheme (y; z), the agent chooses e¤orts a(y) and
b(y) so as to solve
max
(a;b)
fva+ ( + b) y + z   C(a; b)g ; (2)
leading to the rst-order conditions @C=@a = v; @C=@b = y: Our assumptions on the cost function
imply that increasing the power of the incentive scheme raises e¤ort in the measured task and
decreases it in the unobserved one:
da
dy
< 0 <
db
dy
:
It will prove convenient to decompose the agents utility into an allocative term, u(y); which
depends on the endogenous e¤orts, and a redistributiveone, y + z, which does not:
U(y; ; z)  U(a(y); b(y); ; y; z) = u(y) + y + z; (3)
where
u(y)  va(y) + yb(y)  C(a(y); b(y)): (4)
Note that u0(y) = b(y) and @U(y; ; z)=@y =  + b(y):
 Outside opportunities. We assume that any agent can obtain a reservation utility U , so that
employers must respect the participation constraint:
U(y; ; z) = u(y) + y + z  U: (5)
The type-independence of the outside option is a polar case that will help highlight the e¤ects of
competition inside the labor market. Thus, under monopsony every one has reservation utility equal
to U , whereas with competition reservation utilities become endogenous and type-dependent.13
2.2 Firm(s)
A worker of ability  exerting e¤orts (a; b) generates a gross revenue Aa+B(+b) for his employer.
Employing such an agent under contract (y; z) thus results in a net prot of
(; y; z) = (y) + (B   y)    z; (6)
where
(y)  Aa(y) + (B   y) b(y): (7)
represents the allocative component and (B   y)   z a purely redistributive one.
13We make the usual assumption that when a worker is indi¤erent between an employers o¤er and his reservation
utility he chooses the former. We also assume that U is high enough that z  0 in equilbrium (under any degree of
competition), but not so large that hiring some worker type is unprotable (see Appendix D for the exact conditions).
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2.3 Social Welfare
In order to better highlight the mechanism at work in the model, we take as our measure of social
welfare the sum of workersand employerspayo¤s, thus abstracting from any externalities on the
rest of society.14 Again, it will prove convenient to decompose it into an allocative part, w(y), and
a surplus, B, that is independent of the compensation scheme (the transfer (+ b)y+ z nets out):
W (; y)  U(a(y); b(y); ; y; z) + (; y; z) = w(y) +B; (8)
where
w(y)  u(y) + (y) = (A+ v) a(y) +Bb(y)  C(a(y); b(y)): (9)
Using the envelope theorem for the worker, u0(y) = b(y); we have:
w0(y) = Aa0(y) + (B   y) b0(y): (10)
We take w to be strictly concave,15 with a maximum at y < B given by
w0(y) = Aa0(y) + (B   y) b0(y) = 0 (11)
and generating enough surplus that even low types can be protably employed, namely
w(y) + LB > U: (12)
In cases where (underprovision of) the ethicalactivity a also has spillovers on the rest of society
be they technological (pollution), pecuniary (imperfect competition in the product market) or
scal (cost of government bailouts, taxes or subsidies)total social welfare becomes w(y)+ e  a(y),
where e is the per-unit externality. Clearly, this will only strengthen our main results about the
competitive overincentivization of the other activity, b:
3 Competing for Talent
Throughout most of the paper (except for Section 6), v is known while  2 fH ; Lg is private
information, with mean   qLL + qHH :16 We rst consider the polar cases of monopsony and
perfect competition, which make most salient the basic forces at play, then study the full spectrum
14For instance, we can think of rms output as being sold on a perfectly competitive product market. It is,
however, very easy to incorporate social spillovers into the analysis, as we explain below.
15Such is the case, in particular, with quadratic costs; see Appendix A:
16Asymmetric information about ability remains a concern even in dynamic settings where performance generates
ex-post signals about an agents type. First, such signals may be di¢ cult to accurately observe for employers other
than the current one, especially given the multi-task nature of production. Second, many factors can cause  to
vary unpredictably over the life-cycle: age (which a¤ects peoples abilities and preferences heterogeneously), health
shocks, private life issues, news interests and priorities, etc. Finally, di¤erent (imperfectly correlated) sets of abilities
typically become relevant at di¤erent stages of a career e.g., being a good trader or analyst, devising new securities,
bringing in clients, closing deals, managing a division, running and growing an international company, etc.
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of imperfect competition. Before proceeding, it is worth noting that if agentstypes i = H;L were
observable, the only impact of market structure would be on the xed wages zi; whereas incentives
would always remain at the e¢ cient level, yi = y:
3.1 Monopsony Employer
A monopsonist (or set of colluding rms) selects a menu of contracts (yi; zi) aimed at type i 2
fL;Hg. We assume that it wants to attract both types, which, as we will show, is equivalent to qL
exceeding some threshold. The rm thus maximizes expected prot
max
f(yi; zi)gi=H;L
( P
i=H;L
qi [(yi) + (B   yi)i   zi]
)
subject to the incentive constraints
u(yi) + iyi + zi  u(yj) + iyj + zj for all i; j 2 fK;Lg (13)
and the low-productivity types participation constraint
u(yL) + LyL + zL  U: (14)
This program is familiar from the contracting literature. First, incentive constraints, when added
up, yield (i j)(yi yj)  0; so the power of the incentive scheme must be non-decreasing in type
a more productive agent must receive a higher fraction of his measured output. Second, the low
types participation constraint is binding, and the high types rent above U is given by the extra
utility obtained by mimicking the low type: ()yL: Rewriting prots, the monopsonist solves:
max
f(yi; zi)gi=H;L
( P
i=H;L
qi [w(yi) +Bi]  U   qH()yL;
)
yielding ymH = y
(no distortion at the top) and17
w0(ymL ) =
qH
qL
; implying yL < y: (15)
The principal reduces the power of the low-types incentive scheme, so as to limit the high-types
rent. It is optimal for the rm to hire both types if and only if
qL

w(ymL ) +BL   U
  qHymL; (16)
meaning that the prots earned on low types exceed the rents abandoned to high types. By (15),
the di¤erence of the left- and right-hand sides is increasing in qL; so the condition is equivalent to
17To exclude uninteresting corner solutions we shall assume that w0(0) > qH=qL. Since later on we shall impose
various other upper bounds on qH ; this poses no problem.
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qL  qL; where qL is dened by equality in (16).
Proposition 1 (monopsony) Let (16) hold, so that the monopsonist wants to employ both types.
Then ymH = y
 and ymL < y
 is given by
w0(ymL ) =
qH
qL
;
with corresponding xed payments zmH = U + y
m
L   u(y)  Hy and zmL = U   u(ymL )  LymL :
The resulting welfare loss is equal to
Lm = qL [w(y
)  w(ymL )] : (17)
It increases with , but need not be monotonic in A or B:
Note that since total social welfare is qH [w(yH) +BH ]+ qL [w(yL) +BL] ; a mean-preserving
increase in the distribution of  always reduces it, by worsening the informational asymmetry. In
contrast, an increase in A (or a decrease in B) has two opposing e¤ects on Lm : (i) it makes any
given amount of underincentivization on the B task less costly, as the alternative task A is now
more valuable; (ii) the e¢ cient bonus rate y given to the high types declines, and to preserve
incentive compatibility so must ymL ; worsening low typesunderincentivization. In the quadratic
case the two e¤ects cancel out, as shown in Appendix A.
3.2 Perfect Competition in the Labor Market
A large number of rms now compete for workers, each one o¤ering an incentive-compatible menu
of contracts. We rst look for a separating competitive allocation, dened as one in which: (i)
each worker type chooses a di¤erent contract, respectively (yL; zL) and (yH ; zH) for i = H;L;
with resulting utilities UL and UH ; (ii) each of these two contracts makes zero prots, implying in
particular the absence of any cross-subsidy.18 Then, in a second stage, we investigate the conditions
under which this allocation is indeed an equilibrium, and even the unique one.
In a separating competitive equilibrium, any contract that operates must make zero prot:
(H ; yH ; zH) = 0 () (yH) + (B   yH) H = zH ; (18)
(L; yL; zL) = 0 () (yL) + (B   yL) L = zL; (19)
which pins down zH and zL. Furthermore, a simple Bertrand-like argument implies that the low
type must receive his symmetric-information e¢ cient allocation,19
18One can then can indi¤erently think of each rm o¤ering a menu and employing both types of workers, or of
di¤erent rms specializing in a single type by o¤ering a unique contract.
19Absent cross-subsidies, the low type cannot receive more than the total surplus w(y) + LB he generates under
symmetric information, or else his employer would make a negative prot. Were he to receive less, conversely, another
rm could attract him by o¤ering (y; zL = zcL   ") for " small, leading to a prot " on this type (and an even larger
one on any high type who also chose this contract). Low types must thus be o¤ered utility equal to w(y) + LB;
which only their symmetric-information e¢ cient allocation achieves.
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ycL = y
 and zcL = (y
) + (B   y)L:
He should then not benet from mimicking the high type, nor vice-versa,
w(y) +BL  u(yH) + LyH + zH = w(yH) +BH   yH; (20)
w(yH) +BH  w(y) +BL + y; (21)
implying in particular that yH  y: Among all such contracts, the most attractive to the high
types is the one involving minimal distortion, namely such that (20) is an equality:
w(ycH)  w(y)  (B   ycH): (22)
By strict concavity of w; this equation has a unique solution ycH to the right of y
; satisfying
y < ycH < B: The inequality in (21) is then strict, meaning that only the low types incentive
constraint is binding. Note that, as illustrated in Figure I, this is exactly the reverse of what
occurred under monopsony.20
Figure I: Distortions under monopsony and perfect competition
 Existence and uniqueness. When is this least-cost separating (LCS) allocation indeed an equilib-
rium, or the unique equilibrium of the competitive-o¤er game? The answer, which is reminiscent
of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), hinges on whether or not a rm could protably deviate to a
20To build intuition for this reversal, one can look at how the symmetric-information outcome fails incentive
compatibility. Under monopsony no employee obtains any rent, so type is symmetric information contract is:
(yi = y
; zi = U   va(y) + C(a(y); b(y))   [i + b(y)]y): If it were still o¤ered under asymmetric infor-
mation, the high type could then obtain a positive rent ()y by choosing (y; zL); we thus expect the down-
ward incentive constraint to bind. Under perfect competition, the symmetric-information contract for type i is
(yi = y
; zi = (y) + (i   y)B) : If it prevailed under asymmetric information, the low type could obtain extra
utility B by choosing (yH ; zH): We thus now expect the upward incentive constraint to bind.
13
contract that achieves greater total surplus by using a cross-subsidy from high to low types to
ensure incentive compatibility.
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Denition 1 An incentive-compatible allocation f(Ui ; yi )gi=H;L is interim e¢ cient if there exists
no other incentive-compatible f(Ui; yi)gi=H;L that
(i) Pareto dominates it: UH  UH ; UL  UL; with at least one strict inequality.
(ii) Makes the employer break even on average: iqi[w(yi) + iB   Ui]  0:
For the LCS allocation to be an equilibrium, it must be interim e¢ cient. Otherwise, there is
another menu of contracts that Pareto dominates it, which one can always slightly modify (while
preserving incentive-compatibility) so that both types of workers and the employer share in the
overall gain; o¤ering such a menu then yields strictly positive prots. The converse result is also
true: under interim e¢ ciency there can clearly be no positive-prot deviation that attracts both
types of agents, and by a similar type of small redistributionargument one can also exclude those
that attract a single type. These claims are formally proved in the appendix, where we also show
that when the LCS allocation is interim e¢ cient, it is in fact the unique equilibrium. Furthermore,
we identify a simple condition for this to be case:
Lemma 1 The least-cost separating allocation is interim e¢ cient if and only if
qHw
0(ycH) + qL  0: (23)
This condition holds whenever qL exceeds some threshold ~qL < 1:
The intuition is as follows. At the LCS allocation, we saw that the binding incentive constraint
is the low types: U cL = U
c
H   ycH: Consider now an employer who slightly reduces the power of
the high types incentive scheme, yH =  "; while using lump-sum transfers zH = (b(yH) + H)"
+"2 to slightly more than compensate them for the reduction in incentive pay, and zL = "+ "2
to preserve incentive compatibility. Such a deviation attracts both types (UH = UL = "2, since
u0(y) = b(y)) and its rst-order impact on prots is
qH
 
0(yH)  H

yH   zH
  qLzL = qH w0(ycH) + qL ( ")
Under (23) this net e¤ect is strictly negative, hence the deviation unprotable. When (23) fails,
conversely, the increase in surplus generated by the more e¢ cient e¤ort allocation of the high types
is su¢ cient to make the rm and all its employees strictly better o¤. A higher qL = 1  qH means
fewer high types to generate such a surplus and more low types to whom rents (cross-subsidies)
must be given to maintain incentive compatibility, thus making (23) more likely to hold.
We can now state this sections main results.
Proposition 2 (perfect competition) Let qL  ~qL: The unique competitive equilibrium involves
two separating contracts, both resulting in zero prot:
1. Low-productivity workers get (y; zcL); where z
c
L is given by (19).
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2. High-productivity ones get (ycH ; z
c
H); where z
c
H is given by (18) and y
c
H > y
 by
w(y)  w(ycH) = (B   ycH):
3. The e¢ ciency loss relative to the social optimum is
Lc = qH [w(y
)  w(ycH)] = (B   ycH) qH: (24)
It increases with  and A, but need not be monotonic in B:
These results conrm and formalize the initial intuition that competition for talent will result in
an overincentivization of higher-ability types. As shown on Figure I, this is the opposite distortion
from that of the monopsony case, which featured underincentivization of low-ability types. When
the degree of competition is allowed to vary continuously (Section 3.4), we therefore expect that
there will be a critical point at which the nature of the distortion (reecting which incentive
constraint is binding) tips from one case to the other.
 Skill-biased technical change. A higher H exacerbates the competition for talented types, result-
ing in a higher bonus rate ycH that makes their performance-based pay rise more than proportionately
with their productivity BH : This is in line with Lemieux et al.s (2009)) ndings about the con-
tribution of performance pay to rising earnings inequality. This equilibrium market response to
technical or human-capital change is ine¢ cient, however, as it worsens the underprovision of long-
term investments and other voluntary e¤orts inside rms, thereby reducing the social value of the
productivity increase. For a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of s only the deadweight
loss remains, so overall social welfare declines.
What happens when the LCS allocation is not interim e¢ cient, that is, when qL < ~qL? We saw
that it is then not an equilibrium, since there exist protable deviations to incentive-compatible
contracts (involving cross-subsidies) that Pareto-dominate it. We also show in the appendix that
no other pure-strategy allocation is immune to deviations, a situation that closely parallels the
standard Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) problem: the only equilibria are in mixed strategy.21 Since
such an outcome is not really plausible as a stable labor-market outcome, we assume from here on
qL  maxf~qL; qLg  qL: (25)
21An alternative approach is to assume that it is workers who make take-it-or-leave o¤ers, instead of a competitive
industry making o¤ers to them. From Maskin and Tirole (1992) we know that for qL  ~qL; the unique equilibrium of
the resulting informed-principal game is the LCS allocation, so the result is the same as here with competitive o¤ers.
By contrast, for qL  ~qL; the set of equilibrium interim utilities is the set of feasible utilities (incentive compatible and
satisfying budget balance in expectation) that Pareto dominate (UcL, U
c
H). A second alternative is to use a di¤erent
equilibrium concept from the competitive screening literature, as in Scheuer and Netzer (2010); again, this has no
bearing on the region where the separating equilibrium exists. A third alternative would be to introduce search, free
entry by principals and contract posting as in Guerrieri et al. (2010). Self-selection then makes type proportions
among searchers in the market endogenous, in such a way that a separating equilibrium always exists.
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3.3 Welfare: Monopsony versus Perfect Competition
 Single task (A = 0). As a benchmark, it is useful to recall that competition is always socially
optimal with a single task. The competitive outcome is then the single contract yc = y = B; zc =
0; agents of either type are residual claimants for their production and therefore choose the e¢ cient
e¤ort allocation.22 Monopsony, by contrast, leads to a downward distortion in the power of the
incentive scheme. Hence competition is always strictly welfare superior.
 Multitasking. From (17) and (22), Lm < Lc is larger if and only if
qL [w(y
)  w(ymL )] < qH [w(y)  w(ycH)] : (26)
Consider rst the role of labor force composition. As seen from (15) and (22), the monopsony
incentive distortion y   ymL is increasing with qH=qL (limiting the high typess rents becomes
more important), whereas the competitive one, ycH   y is independent of it (being determined by
an incentive constraint across types). For small qH=qL; Lm=Lc is thus of order qL (qH=qL)
2 =qH =
qH=qL; so (26) holds provided qL is high enough. With quadratic costs, we obtain an exact threshold
that brings to light the role of the other forces at play.
Proposition 3 (welfare) Let C(a; b) = a2=2 + b2=2 + ab: Social welfare is lower under compe-
tition than under monopsony if and only if qL  qL and
qH
2qL
+
r
qH
qL
<


1  2

A


: (27)
The underlying intuitions are quite general.23 First, competition entails a larger e¢ ciency loss
when the unrewarded task (long-run investments, cooperation, avoidance of excessive risks, etc.)
is important enough and the two types of e¤ort su¢ ciently substitutable. If they are comple-
ments ( < 0); in contrast, competition is always e¢ ciency-promoting. Second, the productivity
di¤erential  scales the severity of the asymmetric-information problem that underlies both the
monopsony and the competitive distortions. A monopsonistic rm optimally trades o¤ total surplus
versus rent-extraction, so (by the envelope theorem) a small  has only a second-order e¤ect on
overall e¢ ciency. Under competition the e¤ect is rst-order, because a rm raising its yH does not
internalize the deterioration in the workforce quality it inicts on its competitors or, equivalently,
the fact that in order to retain their talent they will also have to distort incentives and the
allocation of e¤ort. This intuition explains why (27) is more likely to hold when  decreases.24
22Similar results holds if A > 0 but v = 0 : since a  0 for all y; the socially optimal bonus rate is y = B; even
though it results in an ine¢ cient e¤ort allocation. This is clearly also the competitive outcome. .
23 In particular, the models solution with quadratic costs (given in Appendix A) also correspond to Taylor approx-
imations of the more general case when  is small, provided 1=(1  2) is replaced everywhere by  w00(y):
24As shown in Appendix C, for small the lower bound ~qL above which (23) holds (and the competitive equilibrium
thus exists) is such that 1  ~qL is of order
p
: Thus, to rigorously apply the above reasoning involving rst- versus
second-order losses for small ; one needs to also let qH become small. This further reduces y   ymL while leaving
ycH   y unchanged. This, in turn, further raises Lc=Lm; making it of order () 3=2 rather than () 1 :
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3.4 Imperfect Competition
To understand more generally how the intensity of labor market competition a¤ects the equilibrium
structure of wages, workers task allocation, rmsprots and social welfare, we now develop a
variant of the Hotelling model in which competitiveness can be appropriately parametrized.
As illustrated in Figure II, a unit continuum of workers is uniformly distributed along the unit
interval, x 2 [0; 1] : Two rms, k = 0; 1; are located respectively at the left and right extremities
and recruit them to produce, with the same production function as before. When a worker located
at x chooses to work for Firm 0 (resp., 1), he incurs a cost equal to the distance tx (resp., t(1 x))
that he must travel. We assume that  and x are independent and that a workers position is not
observable by employers, who therefore cannot condition contracts on this characteristic.
In the standard Hotelling model, agents also have an outside option (e.g., staying put) that yields
a xed level of utility, U: This implies, however, that a change in t a¤ects not only competitiveness
within the market (rm 1 vs. 2) but also, mechanically, that of the outside option formally,
agentsparticipation constraints. To isolate the pure competitiveness of the market from that of
other activities, we introduce an intuitive but novel modeling device, ensuring in particular that
the market is always fully covered.
Figure II: Hotelling with co-located outside options
 Co-located outside option. Instead of receiving the outside option U for free, agents must also
go and get it at either the end of the unit interval, which involves paying the same cost tx or
t(1   x) as if they chose Firm 0 or Firm 1; respectively. One can think of two business districts,
each containing both a multitask rm of the type studied here and a competitive fringe or informal
sector in which all agents have productivity U:25
Without loss of generality, we can assume that each rm k = 0; 1 o¤ers an incentive-compatible
menu of compensation schemes fyki ; zki gi=H;L; in which workers who opt for this employer self-select.
Let Uki denote the utility provided by rm k to type i :
Uki  u(yki ) + iyki + zki : (28)
25Alternatively, each agent could produce U at home but then have to travel (or adapt his human capital) to
one or the other marketplace to sell his output.
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A worker of type i; located at x; will choose rm k = 0 (say) if and only if
Uki   tx  max
n
U   tx; U   t(1  x); U `i   t(1  x)
o
: (29)
The rst inequality reduces to Uki  U : a rm must at least match its local outside option. If both
attract L-type workers, U `i  U as well, so the third inequality makes the second one redundant.
We shall focus the analysis on the (unique) symmetric equilibrium, in which rms attracts
half of the total labor force. To simplify the exposition, we shall take it here as given that: (i)
each rm prefers to employ positive measures of both types of workers than to exclude either one;
(ii) conversely, neither rm wants to corner the market on any type of worker, i.e. move the
corresponding cuto¤ value of x all the way to 0 or 1: In Appendix D we show that neither exclusion
nor cornering can be part of a best response by a rm to its competitor playing the strategy
characterized in Proposition 4 below, as long as
qL  qL; (30)
where qL 2 [qL; 1) is another cuto¤ independent of t: Assuming this condition from here on, we can
focus on utilities
 
Uki ; U
`
i

resulting in interior cuto¤s, so that rm ks share of workers of type i is
xki

Uki ; U
`
i

=
Uki   U `i + t
2t
: (31)
The rm then chooses (UL; UH ; yL; yH) to solve the program:
max
n
qH(UH   U `H + t)[w(yH) + HB   UH ] + qL(UL   U `L + t)[w(yL) + LB   UL]
o
(32)
subject to the constraints (with Lagrange multipliers in parentheses):
UH  UL + yL (H) (33)
UL  UH   yH (L) (34)
UL  U () (35)
To shorten the notation, let mi  w(yi)+ iB Ui denote the rms margin on type i = H;L: The
rst-order conditions, together with the requirement that Ui = U `i in a symmetric equilibrium, are:
qH(mH   t) + H   L = 0 (36)
qL(mL   t) + L   H +  = 0 (37)
tqHw
0(yH) + L = 0 (38)
tqLw
0(yL)  H = 0: (39)
Note that H and L cannot both be strictly positive: otherwise (33) and (34) would bind, hence
yH = yL; rendering (38)-(39) mutually incompatible. This suggests that only one or the other
incentive constraint will typically bind at a given point.
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 Constructing the equilibrium: key intuitions. Solving the above problem over all values of t is
quite complicated, so we shall focus here on the underlying intuitions. The solution to (33)-(39) is
formally derived in Appendix C; because the objective function (32) is not concave on the relevant
space for (UL; UH ; yL; yH); Appendix D then provides a constructive proof that this allocation is
indeed the global optimum. These and other technical complexities (exclusion, cornering) are the
reasons why we conne our analysis to the symmetric separating equilibrium.
(a) For large t; the equilibrium should resemble the monopsonistic one: the main concern is
limiting high typesrent, so rms distort yL < y = yH to make imitating low types unattractive.
Conversely, for small t; the equilibrium should resemble perfect competition: the main concern is
attracting the H types, leading employers to o¤er them high-powered incentives, yH > y = yL:
(b) As t declines over the whole real line, the high typesresponsiveness to higher o¤ered utility
UH rises, so rms are forced to leave them more rent. Since that rent is either yL or yH
(depending on which of the above two concerns dominates, i.e. on which typesincentive constraint
is binding), yL and yH should both be nonincreasing in t:
(c) Firms 0 and 1 are always actively competing for the high types. If t is low enough, they also
compete for L types, o¤ering them a surplus above their outside option: UL > U: At the threshold
t1 below which UL starts exceeding U; yH has a convex kink: since the purpose of keeping yH above
y is to maintain a gap UH  UL = yH just su¢ cient to dissuade low types from imitating high
ones, as UL begins to rise above U; the rate of increase in yH can be smaller.
These intuitions translate into a characterization of the equilibrium in terms of three regions,
illustrated in Figure III and formally stated in Proposition 4 below.26
Figure III: equilibrium incentives under imperfect competition
26With quadratic costs one can show (see Appendix A) that each of the curves is convex, as drawn in the gure.
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Proposition 4 (imperfect competition) Let qL  qL: There exist unique thresholds t1 > 0 and
t2 > t1 such that, in the unique symmetric market equilibrium:
1. Region I (strong competition): for all t < t1; bonuses are yL = y < y^IH(t); strictly decreasing
in t; starting from y^IH(0) = y
c
H : The low types participation constraint is not binding, UL
> U; while his incentive constraint is: UH   UL = y^IH(t):
2. Region II (medium competition): for all t 2 [t 1; t2); bonuses are yL = y < y^IIH (t); with
y^IIH (t) < y^
I
H(t) except at t1 and strictly decreasing in t: The low types participation constraint
is binding, UL = U; and so is his incentive constraint: UH   UL = y^IIH (t):
3. Region III (weak competition): for all t  t2; bonuses are yL = y^L(t) < y = yH ; with y^L(t)
strictly decreasing in t and lim
t!+1 y^L(t) = y
m
L : The low types participation and the high types
incentive constraints are binding : UL = U; UH   UL = y^L(t):
 Welfare. For each value of t, either yL or yH is equal to the (common) rst-best value y; while
the other bonus rate, which creates the distortion, is strictly decreasing in t: Recalling from (8)-(9)
that W = qHw(yH) + qLw(yL) +B we thus have, as illustrated on Figure IV:
Proposition 5 (optimal degree of competition) Social welfare is hill-shaped as a function of
the degree of competition in the labor market, reaching the rst-best at t2 = w(y)+H(B y)+Ly;
where yL = y = yH:
Figure IV: competition and social welfare
Note that we do not subtract fromW the total mobility cost t=4 incurred by agents (equivalently,
we add it to their baseline utility). This is consistent with using t as a measure of pure market
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competitiveness, without introducing an additional wealth e¤ect. In particular, it is required to
yield back the monopsony levels of utility as t ! +1: One can think of t as a tax on mobility
rebated to agents, or as the prots of a monopolistic transportation or human-capital-adaptation
sector with zero marginal cost, engaged in limit pricing against a competitive fringe with marginal
cost t: Alternatively, in contexts where variations in t also involve a net resource cost, one could
subtract it from social welfare (as in Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr 1999). In Appendix A we show
that increases in t can raise aggregate welfare even under this more demanding denition.
We next examine how the gains and losses in total welfare (under either denition) are distrib-
uted among the di¤erent actors in the market.
Proposition 6 (individual welfare and rm prots) As the labor market becomes more com-
petitive (t declines), both UH and UL increase (weakly for the latter), but inequality in workers
utilities, UH   UL always strictly increases; rmstotal prots strictly decline.
In Regions III and II, UL = U: In Region I, UL is decreasing in t, as we show in the appendix.
Since (UH   UL) = is equal to y^H(t) over Regions I and II and to y^L(t) over Region III, it follows
directly from Proposition 4 that @UH=@t  @ (UH   UL) =@t < 0: As to prots, they must clearly
fall as t declines over Regions II and I, since overall surplus is shrinking but all workers are gaining.
In Region III, as y^L(t) rises rms reap some of the e¢ ciency gains from low-type agents more
e¢ cient e¤ort allocation, but the rents they must leave to high types increase even faster (as shown
in the appendix), so total prots decline here as well.
 Income inequality. Let us now examine the e¤ects of a more competitive labor market on earnings,
which is what is measured in practice. While we analyze these comparative statics over all t 2 R+;
the empirically relevant range for most sectors in a modern market economy is that of medium to
high mobility, namely Regions I and II in Figure III. Indeed, this is where rms are more concerned
with retaining and bidding away from each other the workers of high ability who can easily switch
(x close to 1=2) than with exploiting their more captivelocal markets (forcing down the rents of
those with x close to 0 or 1): We compare how the two types of workers i = H;L fare in terms of
total earnings Yi  [b(yi) + i] yi + zi; as well as the separate contributions of performance-based
and xed pay.
Proposition 7 (income inequality) Let qL  qL: As the labor market becomes more competitive
(t declines), both YH and YL increase (weakly for the latter). Furthermore,
1. Over Regions I and II (medium and high competition), inequality in total pay YH   YL rises,
as does its performance-based component. Inequality in xed wages declines, so changes in
performance pay account for more than 100% of the rise in total inequality.
2. Over Region III (low competition), inequality in performance pay declines, while inequality in
xed wages rises. As a result, inequality in total pay need not be monotonic. With quadratic
costs, a su¢ cient condition for it to rise as t declines is B  A+ (1  2):
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These results are broadly consistent with the ndings of Lemieux et al. (2009) about the driving
role of performance pay in rising earnings inequality, as well as their hypothesis that the increased
recourse to performance pay also serves a screening purpose. They are also in line with Frydmans
(2007) evidence linking increased mobility (skills portability) of corporate executives to the rise in
both the level and the variance in their compensation.27 The above properties also imply that the
fraction of the income di¤erential YH   YL that is due to incentive pay, 1  (zH   zL)=(YH   YL);
is U -shaped in t and minimized at t2; where it equals 1: Whereas this value reects the specic
assumption (additive separability of talent and e¤ort) making the rst-best incentive rate y type-
independent, the U shape is a more robust result of competitions opposing e¤ects on the two types
incentive constraints. For this reason we state the next result in terms of changes rather than levels.
Corollary 1 (testing for e¢ ciency) An increase in market competition reduces (raises) aggre-
gate e¢ ciency when it is accompanied by an increase (decrease) in the share of earnings inequality
accounted for by performance-based pay.
This result provides a simple test, based on observables, to assess whether competition is in
the range where it is benecial, or detrimental. Subject to the caveats inherent in interpreting
empirical data through the lens of a simple, two-type model, the evidence discussed above points
to the latter case, especially as ones gets into the upper deciles and then centiles of the earnings
distribution (top 80%, executive pay, nancial sector, etc.).
4 Regulating Compensation
We focus here on the case of perfect competition, which is the most relevant. Since the source of
distortion is the bonus culture, a rst question is whether the regulator is able to distinguish
and treat di¤erently the performance-based and xed parts of compensation. If it is, then absent
other margins that could be distorted, policy can be very e¤ective: as shown below, if bonuses are
capped at y the only equilibrium is a pooling one in which all rms o¤er, and all workers take,
the single contract (y; (y) + (B   y)), thereby restoring the rst best.
Of course, in practice things may not be so simple. First, rms may relabel xed and variable
compensation, in which case only total pay can be regulated, or taxed. Second, they may switch to
alternative forms of rewards that (at the margin) appeal di¤erentially to di¤erent types but may be
even less e¢ cient screening devices than performance bonuses. Plausible examples include latitude
to serve on other companiesboards, to engage in own practice (doctors) or consulting (academics),
lower lock-in to company (low clawbacks, easier terms for quitting).
Let $1 paid in the alternative currencyyield utility $i to a type-i employee, with L < H <
1: We assume that, absent regulation, employers prefer to use incentive pay rather than ine¢ cient
transfers to screen workers:  w0(ycH)

<
1  H

; (40)
27See also Frydman and Saks(2005) evidence on the rising share of performance pay in compensation.
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where   H   L:28 Suppose now that regulation constrains bonuses and consider a rm that
leaves incentives unchanged but substitutes in high typescontract $1 of alternative transfer for a
$H reduction in zH ; it can then also reduce zL by $ while preserving incentive compatibility.
The strategy is protable if qH(1  H)  qL > 0; or
1  H

<
qL
qH
: (41)
Proposition 8 (bonus cap) Assume qL  qL and (40). Under a bonus cap at any y 2 [0; ycH ];
the unique competitive equilibrium has yL = minfy; yg  y and yH = y: Furthermore:
1. If (41) does not hold, alternative transfers are not used: H = L = 0; UH   UL = y and
zL zH = u(y) u(y)+L(y  y): As y is reduced from ycH to y the equilibrium still involves
separating contracts, but now with a growing cross-subsidy from high to low types, and welfare
strictly increases (in the Pareto sense), reaching rst-best at y = y: As y is reduced still
further the equilibrium becomes a pooling one, and welfare strictly decreases.
2. If (41) holds, the equilibrium is always a separating one. Low types receive their constrained-
symmetric-information contract (yL = y; zL = w(y)+(B  y)L) while high types get bonus
y; a non-monetary transfer H = [(B y)+w(y) w(y)]=(1 L) and a monetary transfer
zH = w(y) + (B   y) H   yb(y)  H : Social welfare is now strictly increasing (in the Pareto
sense) in the cap level y; and thus maximized when no binding regulation is imposed (y = ycH):
In the st case, using the alternative currency to screen is too onerous: it entails a substantial
deadweight loss 1 H , would have to be given in large amounts to achieve separation ( small),
or to too many high types (qH=qL large). A bonus cap y < ycH will then successfully limit rms
ability to poach each others high-skill workers through escalating incentive pay, without triggering
other distortions. Such a policy achieves Pareto improvements all the way down to y = y; with
the benets accruing to both types of workers as higher xed pay, which is where competition now
takes place, at the margin.
In the second case, rms increasingly substitute toward ine¢ cient transfers as the bonus cap is
reduced. By (40), even at ycH where the marginal bonus distortion is maximal, it is still smaller
than that from using the alternative currency. A fortiori, the further down y forces yH ; the less
is gained in productive e¢ ciency, while the marginal distortion associated with the alternative
screening device remains constant: a Pareto-worsening welfare loss.29
When the regulator is unable to distinguish the performance-related and xed parts of compen-
sation, the only cap he can impose is on total earnings Y: Such regulations are also counterproductive
28The left-hand side is the surplus gained on each high type when decreasing yH by $1=: This raises the low
types utility from mimicking by $1, so in order to preserve incentive-compatibility the high types contract must
include $1=() in the ine¢ cient currency, while zH is adjusted to keep UH unchanged. Monetary wages (xed plus
variable) thus decrease by $H=, resulting in a net cost equal to the right-hand side of (40), exceeding the benet.
29Allowing the ine¢ cient transfers to have increasing marginal cost (in the form of (1   H)= rising with H)
would combine the two cases.
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when rms have relatively easy access to alternative rewards that allow them to screen and com-
pensate high types. To minimize repetition we focus here on this case (meaning that (41) holds;
otherwise, alternative transfers would again not be used, and regulation e¢ cient).
Proposition 9 (ine¢ cient compensation cap) Assume qL  qL and (40)-(41). Let total earn-
ings be capped at a level Y low enough to be binding on high typescompensation in an unregulated
equilibrium, but not on what they would earn in a rst-best situation of symmetric information:
Aa(y) +Bb(y) +BH  Y  Aa(ycH) +Bb(ycH) +BH = Y cH : (42)
1. If qL is high enough, the unique equilibrium is the LCS allocation in which low types receive
their symmetric-information contract (y; z = w(y) + (B   y)L) while high types get a
package (yrH ; 
r
H ; z
r
H) given by
w(y)  w(yrH) = (B   yrH)   (1  L)

Aa(yrH) +Bb(y
r
H) +BH   Y

;
rH = (y
r
H) +BH + y
r
Hb(y
r
H)  Y ;
zrH =
Y   [H + b(yrH)] yrH :
2. Any tightening of the earnings cap (reduction in Y ) leads to a Pareto deterioration.
Although a conscatory tax of 100% above a ceiling Y is unambiguously welfare reducing, some
positive amount of taxation is always optimal to improve on the laissez-faire bonus culture. While
characterizing the optimal tax in this setting is complicated and left for future work, we can show:
Proposition 10 A small tax  on total earnings always improves welfare: dW=d j=0 > 0:
The intuition is as follows. To start with, condition (40) ensures that, for  su¢ ciently small,
the rm does not nd it protable to resort to ine¢ cient transfers, hence still uses performance pay
to screen workers. Taxing total earnings then has two e¤ects. First, under symmetric information,
it distorts (net) incentives downward from the private and social optimum, y: Second, it shrinks
the compensation di¤erential received by the two types under any given contract. This reduces low
typesincentive to mimic high ones, thus dampening rmsneed to screen through high-powered
(net) incentives and thereby alleviating the misallocation of e¤ort. For small  the rst e¤ect is of
second-order (a standard Harberger triangle), whereas the second one is of rst order, due again
to the externality between rms discussed earlier.
5 Multidimensional Incentives and Noisy Task Measurement
Performance in activity A was so far taken to be non-measurable or non-contractible. Consequently,
e¤ort a was driven solely by intrinsic motivation, or by xed outside incentives such as potential
legal liability or reputational concerns. In the other version of the multitask problem studied by
Holmström and Milgrom (1991), every dimension of performance can be measured but with noise,
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and this uncertainty limits the extent to which risk-averse agents can be incentivized. We now
extend our theory to this case, where there need not be any intrinsic motivation. This variant of
the model is particularly applicable to the issue of short- versus long-term performance and the
possible recourse to deferred compensation, clawbacks and other forms of long-term pay.
Outputs in tasks A and B are now A+a+"A and B+b+"B, where A, B are the employees
talents in each task, a and b his e¤orts as before, and "A, "B independent random shocks with
"A  N (0; 2A) and "B  N (0; 2B): A compensation package is a triple (yA; yB; z) where yA and
yB are the bonuses on each task and z the xed wage. As in Holmström and Milgrom (1991),
agents have mean-variance preferences. Letting r denote the index of risk aversion, utility is thus:
U(a; b; A; B; y; z) = (A + a)yA + (B + b)yB + z   C(a; b)  r
2

(yA)22A + (y
B)22B

; (43)
with the cost function having the same properties as before. Given an incentive vector y  (yA; yB),
the agent chooses e¤orts a(y) and b(y) that jointly solve Ca(a(y); b(y)) = yA; Cb(a(y); b(y)) = yB;
it is easily veried that a(y) is increasing in yA and decreasing in yB; while b(y) has the opposite
properties. The rms prot function remains unchanged, so total surplus is w(y) + AA + BB,
where the allocative component is now equal to
w(y)  Aa(y) +Bb(y)  C(a(y); b(y))  r
2

(yA)22A + (y
B)22B

: (44)
Assuming strict concavity and an interior solution, the vector of rst-best bonuses y  (yA; yB)
solves the rst-order conditions:
@w
@yA
 
yA; yB

=
@w
@yB
 
yA; yB

= 0; (45)
which is shown in the appendix to imply that yA < A and yB < B:
There are again two types of workers, H and L, in proportions qH and qL; who each select their
preferred contract from the menus

(yAi ; y
B
i ; zi)
	
i=H;L
o¤ered by rms. Denoting y  yH   yL
and   H   L for each task  = A;B; incentive compatibility requires thatP
=A;B
(y )( )  0: (46)
To simplify the analysis, we assume H types to be more productive in both tasks: A  0 and
B > 0 (otherwise, which type is betterdepends on the slopes of the incentive scheme).
 Monopsony. Denoting Di  AAi +BBi for i = H;L; a monopsonistic employer solves
max
f(Ui;yi)gi=H;L
fqH [w(yH) +DH   UH ] + qL [w(yL) +DL   UL]g; subject to
UL  U;
UH  UL + yALA + yBLB:
26
This yields ymH = y
, while ymL is given by
1
A
@w
@yA
(ymL ) =
1
B
@w
@yB
(ymL ) =  
qH
qL
: (47)
As before, the incentives of low types (only) are distorted downward, now in both activities. Note
also how the e¢ ciency losses, normalized by their o¤setting rent reductions, are equalized across
the two tasks. As before, one can show that it is indeed optimal to employ both types as long as
qL is above some cuto¤ qL < 1; which we shall assume.
 Perfect competition. We look again for a least-cost separating equilibrium. Denoting USIL 
w(y) +DL type Ls symmetric-information utility, such an allocation must solve:
max
f(Ui;yi)gi=H;L
fUHg; subject to
UH = w(yH) +DH ;
USIL  UH   yAHA   yBHB:
Let c denote the shadow cost of the second constraint. The rst-order conditions are then
1
A
@w(yH)
@yAH
=
1
B
@w(yH)
@yBH
=  c; (48)
while the binding incentive constraint takes the form
w(y)  w(yH) =
 
A  yAH

A +
 
B   yBH

B: (49)
Hence, a system of three equations determining (yA;cH ; y
B;c
H ; 
c); independently of the prior probabil-
ities, as usual for the LCS allocation. Clearly, high-ability agents are again overincentivized, now
in both tasks. Note also that even though competitive rms and monopsonist use screening for
very di¤erent purposes, resulting in opposite types of distortions, both equalize those distortions
(properly normalized by unit rents) across the two tasks.
The LCS allocation is, once again, the (unique) equilibrium if and only if it is interim e¢ cient.
In the appendix we generalize Lemma 1 to show:
Lemma 2 The LCS allocation ycH is interim e¢ cient if and only if
1
A
@w(ycH)
@yAH
=
1
B
@w(ycH)
@yBH
   qL
qH
(50)
or, equivalently, c  qL=qH :
This condition generalizes (23) and has the same interpretation, which can now be given in
terms of either task. Intuitively, the larger the distortion in the partial derivatives, the higher
the welfare loss relative to rst best; condition (50) requires that it not be so large as to render
protable a deviation to a more e¢ cient contract sustained by cross-subsidies.
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 Competition vs. monopsony. Competition yields lower welfare when Lm = qL [w(y)  w (ymL )]
< qH [w(y
)  w(ycH)] = Lc: One simple case in which this occurs is, as before, when qH=qL is
small enough. Indeed w(y)   w(ycH) is independent of this ratio, whereas under monopsony the
distortion becomes small as the high types from whom it seeks to extract rents become more scarce:
as qH=qL tends to zero, (47) shows that ymL tends to y
 and y  ymL is of order (qH=qL) : Therefore
w(y)  w (ymL ) is of order (qH=qL)2 ; implying that Lm << Lc:
Proposition 11 There exist qH such that for all qH  qH ; welfare is higher under monopsony
than under competition.
 Quadratic cost. This specication allows for many further results, particularly on comparative
statics. First, e¤ort levels are a =
 
yA   yB =  1  2 and b(y) =  yB   yA =  1  2 ; which
are non-negative as long as yA=yB 2 [; 1=] : Next, note that the rst-order conditions of the
rst-best, monopsony and competitive problems lead to very similar systems of linear equations,
A  B   yAi + yBi   r
 
1  22AyAi =  ~  1  2A; (51)
B   A  yBi + yAi   r
 
1  22ByBi =  ~  1  2B; (52)
with the only di¤erence being that (yi = y; ~ = 0) in the rst case, (yi = ymL ; ~ = qH=qL) in the
second, and (yi = ycH ; ~ = 
c) in the third. In particular, the rst-best solution is
yA =
r2B (A  B) +A
1 + r
 
2A + 
2
B

+ (1  2)r22A2B
< A; (53)
and a similar formula for yB < B; obtained by permuting the roles of A and B: The condition
  yA =yB  1=, which ensures that a(y)  0 and b(y)  0; is then equivalent to30
r2A
1 + r2B
 A  B
B   A 
1 + r2A
r2B
: (54)
The properties of this rst-best benchmark parallel those in Holmström and Milgrom (1991).
Proposition 12 The rst-best incentive yA is decreasing in B in 2A; and conversely increasing
in A and 2B; whereas y
B has the opposite properties. Both are decreasing in risk aversion, r:
Turning next to monopsony and competition, the system (51)-(52) can also be rewritten in
terms of the price distortions y   y;  = A;B; leading to the following set of results.
30An alternative way of ensuring that a remains non-negative (allowing 2A to become arbitrary large) is of course to
incorporate intrinsic motivation vaa into (43), with va  B: The model then nests that of Section 2 as a limiting case
for (2A; 
2
B) ! (+1; 0): Alternatively, a < 0 (say) may be interpreted as nefarious or antisocial activities (stealing
coworkersideas, devising schemes to deceive customers, et.) that require e¤ort but allow the agent to increase his
performance and bonus earnedin the B dimension.
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Proposition 13 (incentive distortions) The relative overincentivization of task B compared to
task A induced by competition is equal to the relative underincentivization of task B compared to
task A induced by monopsony:
yB;cH   yB
yA;cH   yA
=
yB   yB;mL
yA   yA;mL
=

1 + r
 
1  22AB + A
1 + r (1  2)2B

A + B
   2A; 2B;A=B; r : (55)
It is greater:
(i) The greater the noise 2A in task A and the the lower the noise 
2
B in task B;
(ii) The greater the comparative advantage B=A of H types in task B; relative to task A;
(iii) The greater workersrisk aversion if 2A=
2
B > 
A=B (and the smaller if not).
These results are intuitive: more noisy measurement makes a task a less e¢ cient screening de-
vice whether for rent-extraction or employee-selection purposeswhile a higher ability di¤erential
of low and high types makes it a more e¢ cient one. As to the mirror imageproperty of relative
price wedges under monopsony and competition, it reects the fact that both types of rms equalize
the (normalized) marginal distortions across tasks.31 We next consider workerse¤ort allocations.
Proposition 14 (e¤ort distortions) (1) Competition distorts high-skill agentse¤ort ratio away
from task A; and monopsony away from task B; a(ycH)=b(y
c
H) < a(y
)=b(y) < a(ymL )=b(y
m
L ); if and
only if
A  B
B   A >
A
B
: (56)
(2) Competition reduces the absolute level of e¤ort on task A, a(ycH) < a(y
); while increasing
that on task B (and monopsony has the opposite e¤ects), if and only if
r2A
1 + r2B
>
A
B
: (57)
The broad message of Proposition 14 accords with that of Sections 3.1-3.2, but it also yields
several new insights about how the misallocation of e¤orts is shaped by the measurement error in
each the two tasks, their substitutability in e¤ort, high-skill agentscomparative advantage in one
or the other of them, and the degree of risk aversion. The second result is particularly noteworthy:
even though both tasks are more strongly incentivized under competition, e¤ort in task A declines,
because task B becomes disproportionately rewarded.32
 Changes in technology and monitoring. Two important trends may have decreased A=B
and increased A=B; making (57) more likely to hold and magnifying the relative wedge in (55).
First, skill-biased technical change (information technology, leverage) plausibly raises high-ability
31One can also solve explicitly the system with ~ = qH=qL for the monopsony solution ymL = (y
A;m
L ; y
B;m
L ): In the
competitive case, the LCS condition (49) is quadratic in (yA;cL ; y
B;c
L ), so by (55) it reduces to a quadratic equation in
yA;cL only (or equivalently, in 
c):
32Note also that when (54) holds, so that a(y)  0; b(y)  0; (57) implies (56).
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workersproductivity advantage more in generating individual output or sales than in cooperating
with others or avoiding risks. Second, the increased monitoring of managers that occurs as corporate
boards become more independent (Hermalin 2005) may improve information about earnings, costs
and market share more than about long-term safety, environmental and legal liabilities.
Finally, we can also state precisely when competition or monopsony is more e¢ cient. As before,
we denote q
L
the threshold value of qL above which the monopsonist employs both types, ~qL =
c=(1 + c) the minimum value ensuring that the LCS allocation is the competitive outcome, and
qL  maxfqL; ~qLg:
Proposition 15 (social welfare) Let qL  qL: Social welfare is then higher under monopsony
than under competition if and only if qH=qL < (c)2:
The condition ensures that qL(yA   yA;mL )2 < qH(yA;mH   yA)2, meaning that the losses from
the mispricing of activity A are higher under competition. Since the mispricing of B is proportional
to that of A; with the same coe¢ cient  under monopsony and competition, total losses are also
higher.
6 Competition for the Motivated
We now return to the benchmark specication of Section 3 (task A is non-contractible, task B
is perfectly measurable, agents are risk-neutral) and study the polar case where all workers have
the same productivity  (normalized to 0 without loss of generality) in task B but di¤er in their
ethicalmotivations v for task A : a fraction qL has v = vL and the remaining qH have v = vH :
When facing compensation scheme (y; z); an agent of type vi has net utility ui(y) + z; where
ui(y)  max
(a;b)
fvia+ yb  C(a; b)g: (58)
Let ai(y) and bi(y) denote the corresponding e¤orts, namely the solutions to the system fCa(a; b) =
vi and Cb(a; b) = yg; and note that u0i(y) = b: Concavity of the cost function implies here again that
a0i(y) < 0 < b
0
i(y); as well as aL(y) < aH(y) and bH(y) < bL(y) in response to any given incentive
rate y > 0:The employer of an agent with type vi makes net prot i(y)  z; where
i(y)  Aai(y) + (B   y)bi(y): (59)
Finally, we denote
wi(y)  ui(y) + i(y); (60)
yi  argmaxfwi(y)g: (61)
In contrast to the case of heterogeneity in talent ; there are now generally di¤erent optimal incentive
rates for each type of worker.33 Next, we note that when confronted with an incentive-compatible
33 In the quadratic-cost benchmark, yL = y

H = B   A: In general, the variation of y with v involves the third
derivatives of C and is thus ambiguous.
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menu of options, the more pro-social type (vH) chooses a less powerful incentive scheme:34
yH  yL (and so zH  zL).
This, in turn, implies that if aL and aH denote the two typesequilibrium e¤orts on task A, then
aL  aH : The more pro-socially inclined employee exerts more e¤ort on task A both because he is
more motivated for it and because he chooses a lower-powered incentive scheme.
 Monopsony. The monopsonist o¤ers an incentive-compatible menu (yL; zL) and (yH ; zH); or
equivalently (yL; UL) and (yH ; UH) so as to solve:
max
f(yi; zi)gi=H;L
f P
i=H;L
qi [wi(yi)  Ui] g; subject to
UL  U
UH  UL + uH(yL)  uL(yL)
UL  UH + uL(yH)  uH(yH):
The rst two constraints must clearly be binding, while the third imposes yH  yL; as seen above.
Substituting in, the solution satises
ymH = y

H ; (62)
w0L(yL) =
qH
qL

u0H(yL)  u0L(yL)

=
qH
qL
[bH(y)  bL(y)] ; (63)
when it is interior; more generally, the left-hand side of (63) must be no greater than the right-hand
side. Since the latter is strictly negative, one must have ymL > y

L in any case: the monopsonist
o¤ers a higher-powered incentive scheme than under symmetric information so as to limit the rent
of the more prosocial types, who clearly benets less from an increase in y.
 Perfect competition. Because employeesintrinsic-motivation benets va are private, rms have
no reason to compete to select more prosocial types. As a result, the kind of incentive distortion
seen earlier does not arise, and the competitive equilibrium is the symmetric-information outcome.
Employers o¤er the menu f(yi ; zi )gi=H;L; where for each type yi is the e¢ cient incentive rate
dened by (61) and zi  i(yi ); leaving the rm with zero prot. Type i = H;L then chooses
max
j2fH;Lg

ui(y

j ) + i(y

j ) = wi(y

j )
	
: (64)
By denition, j = i is the optimal choice, so the symmetric-information outcome is indeed incentive
compatible.
Proposition 16 When agents are similar in measurable talent  but di¤er in their ethical values
v; monopsony leads to an overincentivization of low-motivation types, ymL > y

L (with y
m
H = y

H),
whereas competition leads to the rst-best outcome, ycL = y

L; y
c
H = y

H :
34Adding up the two incentive constraints, UH  UL + uH(yL)  uL(yL) and UL  UH   uH(yH) + uL(yH); yields
0  R yL
yH
[u0H(y)  u0L(y)] dy =
R yL
yH
[bH(y)  bL(y)] dy: Since bH(y) < bL(y) for all y; the result follows.
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Would conclusions di¤er under an alternative specication of the impact of prosocial hetero-
geneity? Suppose that instead of enjoying task A more, a more prosocial agent supplies more
unmeasured positive externalities on the rm (or on her coworkers, so that their productivity is
higher, or their wages can be reduced due to a better work environment). In other words, agents
i = H;L share the same preferences,
ui(y) = max
(a;b)
fva+ yb  C(a; b)g  u(y)
but have di¤erent productivities in the A activity,
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i(y) = A (a(y) + i) + (B   y)b(y): (65)
Under this formulation there is no way to screen an agents type, so the outcome under both
monopsony and competition is full pooling at the e¢ cient incentive power:
yi = y
  argmaxfAa(y) +Bb(y)  C (a(y); b(y))g: (66)
Sorting will occur, on the other hand, when agents intrinsic motivation is not unconditional, as
we have assumed, but reciprocal that is, dependent on the presence in the same rm of other
people who act cooperatively (e.g., Kosfeld and von Siemens (2011)), or on the rm fullling a
socially valuable mission rather than merely maximizing prots (e.g., Besley and Ghatak 2005,
2006, Brekke and Nyborg 2006). The fact that the benets of competing for the motivated
are somewhat attenuated in our model with respect to those only reinforces the contrast with the
potentially very distortionary e¤ects of competition for talent, thus further strengthening our
main message.
7 Conclusion
This paper has examined how the extent of labor market competition a¤ects the structure of
incentives, multitask e¤orts and outcomes such as short- and long-run prots, earnings inequality
and aggregate e¢ ciency. The analysis could be fruitfully extended in several directions.
First, one could analyze increased competition as a reduction in xed costs and examine whether
there is too little or too much entry into the market. The modeling device of co-located outside
options we introduced into the linear Hotelling model should work for the circular one as well.
More generally, it could prove useful in other settings, as it allows for a clean separation between
intra- and inter-market (or brand) competition and ensures that the market remains covered at all
levels of competitiveness between Bertrand and monopoly.
A second extension is to allow for asymmetries between rms or sectors. For instance, task
unobservability may be less of a concern for some (e.g., private-equity partnerships) and more for
others (large banks), but if they compete for talent the high-powered incentives e¢ ciently o¤ered in
the former may spread to the latter, and do damage there. Heterogeneity also raises the question of
the self-selection of agents into professions and their matching with rms or sectors, e.g., between
nance and science or engineering.
Our analysis has focused on increased competition in the labor market, but similar e¤ects could
arise from changes in the product market. One can thus envision settings in which high-skill workers
become more valuable as rms compete harder for customers, for instance because the latter become
more sensitive to quality. Finally, the upward pressure exerted on pay by competition could also
result in agents motivated primarily by monetary gain displacing intrinsically motivated ones within
(some) rms, potentially resulting in a di¤erent but equally detrimental form of bonus culture.
This idea is pursued in Bénabou and Tirole (2013).
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Appendix A: Quadratic-Cost Case
Let the cost function be
C(a; b) = a2=2 + b2=2 + ab: (A.1)
with 2 < 1; ensuring convexity. The main case of interest is  > 0 (e¤orts are substitutes), but
all derivations and formulas hold with  < 0 (complements) as well. The rst-order conditions for
(2) yield v = a+ b; and y = b+ a; hence
a(y) =
v   y
1  2 ; b(y) =
y   v
1  2 ; and a
0(y) =
 
1  2 ; b
0(y) =
1
1  2 : (A.2)
Equations (10)-(11) then lead to
y = B   A; (A.3)
w(y)  w(y) =  
Z y
y
w0(z) dz =  
Z y
y

y   z
1  2

dz =
(y   y)2
2 (1  2) : (A.4)
1. Monopsony. Substituting the last two expressions into Proposition 1 yields
ymL = y
   (1  2)qH
qL
; (A.5)
Lm =
1
2
q2H
qL
(1  2)()2: (A.6)
2. Perfect competition. From (A.4) and (22), we get:
1
2 (1  2)(y
c
H   y)2 = (B   ycH): (A.7)
Let   ycH   y = ycH  B+ A > 0 and ! 
 
1  2: Then Q()  2+2! (   A) = 0 and
solving this polynomial yields  =  ! +
p
!2 + 2!A > 0; or
ycH = B   A  ! +
p
!2 + 2!A: (A.8)
Note that ycH < B; since ! + A >
p
!2 + 2!A: Using (22), the The resulting e¢ ciency loss
relative to the social optimum is
Lc = qH [w(y
)  w(ycH)] = (B   ycH) qH =

A+ !  
p
!2 + 2!A

qH: (A.9)
Finally, the least-cost separating allocation is interim e¢ cient if (23) holds, which here becomes
1
1  qL 
r
1 +
2A
!
; or equivalently (A.10)
A
!
 1
2

qL
qH
2
+
qL
qH
: (A.11)
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3. Welfare under monopsony versus competition. Using (A.6) and (A.9), condition (26) becomes:
q2H
2qL
 
1  2 ()2 < (B   ycH)qH () qH2qL! < A   ()  < A  qH2qL!:
Substituting into the polynomial equation Q()  0; this is equivalent to:
A  qH
2qL
!
2
> 2!

qH
2qL
!

=
qH
qL
!2;
which yields (27). This inequality and the interim e¢ ciency condition (A.11) are simultaneously
satised if and only if
M(qL)  1  qL
2qL
+
r
1  qL
qL
<

1  2
A

 1
2

qL
1  qL
2
+
qL
1  qL 
M(qL): (A.12)
Note that:
(i) M(qL) < M(qL) if and only if qH=qL < 1; so for any qL > 1=2; (A.12) denes a nonempty
range for (A=)

=(1  2) :
(ii) As qL ! 1; M(qL) ! 0 and M(qL) ! +1; so arbitrary values of (A=)

=(1  2)
become feasible, including arbitrarily large values of A or arbitrarily low values of : In particular,
imposing A < B(1 2) qH=qL to ensure 0 < y < ymL is never a problem for qL large enough.
4. Imperfect competition. In Region I, y^H(t) is dened as the solution to (C.22) in Appendix
C, which here becomes:
(yH   y)2
2(1  2)   (B   yH) +
t
qL
(yH   y)
(1  2) = 0 ()
2 + 2 (t=qL)    2!(A  ) = 2 + 2(! + t=qL)   2!A = 0;
with the above denitions of ! and  = yH   y: Solving, we have:
y^H(t) = B   A  t=qL   ! +
p
(! + t=qL)2 + 2!A: (A.13)
It is easily veried that y^H(0) = ycH and
qL  y^0H(t) =  1 +
! + t=qLp
(! + t=qL)2 + 2!A
< 0: (A.14)
Moreover, this expression is increasing in t; so y^H(t) is decreasing and convex over Region I.
In Region II, y^H(t) is dened as the solution to (C.25) in Appendix 7, which here becomes:
w(y) + LB   (yH   y
)2
2(1  2) + (B   yH)  
t

(yH   y)
(1  2)  
U   t = 0 ()
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2
2(1  2) + (   A) +
t


(1  2)   LB +
U + t  w(y) = 0 ()
2 + 2(   A)! + 2t

+ 2(1  2)   U + t  LB   w(y) = 0 ()
2 + 2(! + t=)  2A!   2(1  2)  w(y) + LB   U   t = 0:
Solving, we have:
y^H(t) = B   A  t= !+
q
(! + t=)2 + 2[!A+ (1  2)  w(y) + LB   U   t]; (A.15)
noting that the expression under the square root can also be written as !2 + (t=)2 + 2[!A +
(1  2)  w(y) + LB   U] > 0: Moreover,
y^0H(t)() =  1 +
1q
1 + 2[!A+ (1  2)  w(y) + LB   U   t =(! + t=)2] < 0
and it is increasing in t; so y^H(t) is decreasing and convex over Region II.
In Region III, y^L(t) is dened as the solution to (C.29). Denoting  = yL y; this now becomes:
w(y) + LB   U   t+ (A  )   tqL
qH

(1  2) = 0 ()
(1  2) w(y) + LB   U   t+ A =  ! + tqL
qH

:
Solving, we have:
y^L(t) = B   A 
(1  2)  U + t  w(y)  LB  !A
! + tqL=qH
: (A.16)
It is easily veried that limt!+1 y^L(t) = B   A  (1  2)qH=qL = ymL : Moreover, by (12),
y^0L(t)() =
(qL=qH)

U   w(y)  LB   A
  !
(! + tqL=qH)
2 =(1  2) < 0
and this function is increasing in t; implying that y^L(t) is convex. 
Welfare e¤ects of transport costs (claim following Proposition 5). Let W (t) =
w(y^H(t)) + qLw(y^L(t)) + B and ~W (t)  W (t)   t=4: By Proposition 5, W 0(t) > 0 for all
t < t2: We now nd conditions ensuring that ~W 0(t) > 0 for t small enough. For t  t1;W 0(t) =
qHw
0(y^H(t))y^0H(t): With quadratic costs, and using (A.4), (A.8) and (A.14), qHw
0(ycH)y^
0
H(0) =
(qH=qL)
p
1 + 2A=!   1

1  1=p1 + 2A=! ; which for small  is equivalent to (qH=qL)p
2A=!: As seen from (A.10), interim e¢ ciency requires qH  (1 + 2A=!) 1=2 
p
!=2A:
Letting qH /
p
!=2A yields qHW 0(0)y^0H(0)  1=qL > 1=4; hence the result. 
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Proof of Proposition 13. Subtracting the rst-best solution from (51)-(52) and denoting
x  y   y,  = A;B; yields
  [1 + r  1  22A]xA + xB =  ~  1  2A; (A.17)
xA   [1 + r  1  22B]xB =  ~  1  2B; (A.18)
from which  = xB;cH =x
A;c
H = x
B;m
L =x
A;m
L is easily obtained. Its comparative statics follow from
direct computation. 
Proof of Proposition 14. (1) It easily seen that a(ycH)=b(y
c
H) < a(y
)=b(y) < a(ymL )=b(y
m
L )
if and only if yB=yA < xB;cH =x
A;c
H = x
B;m
L =x
A;m
L = : Using (53) and (55), this means:
1 + r
 
1  22BA + B
1 + r (1  2)2A

B + A
<
r2B (A  B) +A
r2A (B   A) +B
:
This can be rewritten as
A
B
<

1 + r
 
1  22A r2B (A  B) +A   r2A (B   A) +B
1 + r (1  2)2B
 
r2A (B   A) +B
   r2B (A  B) +A
=

1 + r
 
1  22A r2B (A  B) +A  B + r2A [A  B]
1 + r (1  2)2B

r2A (B   A) +B   A+ r2B (B   A)
;
which simplies to (56).
(2) We have a(ycH) < a(y
) < a(ymL ) if and only if x
A;c
H < x
B;c
H and x
A;m
L > x
B;m
L ; which given
that x;cH > 0 > x
;m
L for  = A;B; means that  > 1:This occurs when


1 + r
 
1  22AB + 2A > 1 + r  1  22BA + B ()
r
 
1  2 2AB   2BA > (1  )2A () r 2AB   2BA > A;
which yields (57). Furthermore, b(ycH) > b(y
) if only if xBH > x
A
H ; i.e.  > ; which is implied by
 > 1: Note, on the other hand, that competition always increases total gross output above the
e¢ cient level, Aa(y)+Bb(y) < Aa(ycH)+Bb(y
c
H); if only if 0 < A
 
xAH   xBH

+B
 
xBH   xAH

; or
equivalently (since xAH > 0) 0 < A (1  )+B (  ) = A B+(B A); which always holds.
For a monopsonist xAL < 0; so the same condition yields Aa(y
m
L ) +Bb(y
m
L ) < Aa(y
) +Bb(y): 
Proof of Proposition 15. Since w(y) is quadratic and minimized at y;
w(y)  w (ymL ) =
1
2
(y   ymL )T H(w)jy  (y   ymL ) =
 
xAm
2
2
(1 ) H(w)jy (1 )T ;
w(y)  w (ycH) =
1
2
(y   ycH)T H(w)jy  (y   ycH) =
 
xAc
2
2
(1 ) H(w)jy (1 )T ;
where H is the Hessian of w and we used Proposition (14). Therefore, Lm < Lc if and only if
qL
 
xAm
2
< qH
 
xAc
2
: By Proposition 13, xAm=x
A
c = x
B
m=x
B
c = (qH=qL
c); hence the result. 
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Appendix B: Nonlinear Contracts
We allow here for general reward functions Y (r); where r  b+  and Br is the employers revenue
on the veriable task. As it will be more convenient to work directly with e¤ort b rather than the
marginal incentive y(b)  Y 0(b); let us dene the pseudo-cost function
C^(b)  min
a
fC(a; b)  vag ; (B.1)
and denote a^(b) the minimizing choice. It is easily veried that a^0(b) < 0 when Cab < 0 and that
C^(b) is strictly convex. To preclude unbounded solutions, we shall assume that limb!+1 C^ 0(b)  B:
The allocative component of total surplus is
w^(b)  Aa^(b) +Bb  C^(b); (B.2)
which shall take to be strictly quasiconvex and maximized at b > 0: The e¤ort levels bi chosen by
each type i = H;L are given by C^ 0(bi) = Y 0(bi+i); with resulting utilities are Ui = Y (bi+i) C^(bi);
so the relevant participation and incentive constraints are now:
UL = Y (bL + L)  C^(bL)  U; (B.3)
UH  UL + C^(bL)  C^(bL  ); (B.4)
UL  UH   C^(bH +) + C^(bH): (B.5)
Summing up the last two yields C^(bL)   C^(bL   )  C^(bH + )   C^(bH), which by strict
convexity of C^ requires that rL  bL + L < bH + H  rH :
1. Monopsony. As before, the low typesparticipation and high types incentive constraints
must be binding in an optimum, so the rm solves
max
fbH ;bLg
( P
i=H;L
qi

w^(bi) +Bi   U
  qH [C^(bL)  C^(bL  )]) ;
leading to bmH = b
 and
w^0(bmL ) =
qH
qL
h
C^ 0(bmL )  C^ 0(bmL  )
i
(B.6)
when the solution is interior and to bmL =  when it is not; in either case, b
m
L < b
:
As before, the rm is willing to employ the low types provided the prots they generate exceed
the rents abandoned to the high types:
qL

w^(bmL ) +BL   U
  qH [C^(bL)  C^(bL  )]; (B.7)
which denes a lower bound q
L
< 1 for qL: Compared with the case of linear incentives, the greater
exibility a¤orded by nonlinear schemes allows the monopsonist to reduce the high types rents,
UH = U + C^(b
m
L )  C^(bmL  ) < U + C^ 0(bmL )  U + ymL (B.8)
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while keeping the distortion underincentivization of the low typesunchanged, thereby increasing
his prots.
2. Perfect competition. In a separating competitive equilibrium (with no cross-subsidies),
Ui = w(bi) +iB for i = L;H; and by the same argument as in Section 3.2 the low type must get
his e¢ cient symmetric-information allocation, so bcL = b
: Furthermore, among all such allocations
that are incentive-compatible, the most attractive to high types is the LCS one, dened by:
bH  argmax
b
n
w^(b) j w^(b)  w^(b)  B   C^(b+) + C^(b)
o
: (B.9)
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier as   0; the rst-order condition is  w^0(b)(1   ) = [C^ 0(b +
)  C^ 0(b)]; requiring that b  b and leading to two cases:
(i) If C^(b +)  C^(b)  B; then b = b:
(ii) If C^(b +)  C^(b) < B; then bH is uniquely given by
w^(b)  w^(bcH) = B   C^(bcH +) + C^(bcH); (B.10)
since 
(b)  w^(b)  w^(b)+ C^(b+)  C^(b) is strictly increasing on (b;+1); with 
(b) < B
and 
(b)  C^ 0(b) > B for all b large enough: Competition now leads to overincentivization
only if C^(b + )   C^(b) is not too large, meaning that b itself is not too large, which in turn
occurs when A is large enough.35 Whereas the greater exibility a¤orded by nonlinear contracts
allows a monopsonist to reduce the high types rents and increase his prots, in a competitive
industry those benets are appropriated by the high types, in the form of more e¢ cient contracts:
w^(b)  w^(bcH)  B   C^(bcH +) + C^(bcH) < B   C^ 0(bcH)  (B   bcH): (B.11)
As before, the above separating allocation is the equilibrium if and only if it is interim e¢ cient,
meaning that there is no protable deviation consisting of lowering bH by a small amount bH =  "
to increase total surplus while o¤ering compensating transfers YL = [C^ 0(bH + )   C^ 0(bH)]" to
low types so as to maintain incentive compatibility (note that UH = [Y 0(bH + H)  C^ 0(bH)]" = 0
to the rst order). In other words,
qHw^
0
H(bH) + qL
h
C^ 0(bH +)  C^ 0(bH)
i
 0; (B.12)
which denes a lower bound ~qL < 1 for qL: We denote again qL  maxf qL; ~qLg:
The following proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 17 Let qL > qL: With unrestricted nonlinear contracts, it remains the case that:
1. A monopsonist distorts downward the measurable e¤ort of low types: bmL < b
 = bmH ; with b
m
L
given by (B.6).
35Note that C^(b +)  C^(b) < C^0(b +); so C^(b +)  C^(b) < B if b < C^0 1(B) : This, in
turn, occurs when Aa^0[C^0 1(B) ] +B < C^0[C^0 1(B) ]; for which it su¢ ces that A be large enough.
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2. Under perfect competition, if C^(b+) C^(b) < B; rms distort upwards the measurable
e¤ort of high types: bcL = b
 < bcH ; with b
c
H given by (B.10). If C^(b
 +)   C^(b)  B;
both e¤ort levels are e¢ cient: bcL = b
 = bcH :
For small , Taylor expansions show that: (i) b bmL is, as before, of order ; with coe¢ cient
qH=qL; (ii) under competition, since C^ 0(b) < B; bcH b is positive and again of order
p
; with
coe¢ cient independent of qH and qL; (iii) 1  ~qL is also of order : Therefore, the ratio Lc=Lm is
at least of the same order as qH=qL [(qH=qL)]
2 = (qL=qH); or equivalently ()
 3=2 ; and
hence arbitrarily large.
3. Quadratic-cost case. Here again, the cost function (A.1) leads to explicit and transpar-
ent solutions, including for the comparison of e¢ ciency losses under monopsony and competition.
Minimizing C(a; b)  va over a leads to a^(b) = v   b and
C^(b) =
1
2
[b2   (v   b)2] = 1
2

(1  2)b2 + 2vb  v2 : (B.13)
Therefore C^ 0(b) = (1  2)b+ v and w^0(b) = B    (A+ v)  (1  2)b; leading to
(1  2)b = B    (A+ v) ; (B.14)
w^(b)  w^(b) =  w00(b)(b  b
)2
2
=
1  2
2
(b  b)2;
C^(b)  C^(b) = w^(b)  w^(b) + (B   A) (b  b)
=
1  2
2
(b  b)2 + (B   A) (b  b): (B.15)
Under monopsony, bmL is dened (when interior) by (B.6), which now becomes:
B    (A+ v)  (1  2)bmL =
qH
qL
(1  2) ()
bmL = b
   qH
qL
: (B.16)
This is the same outcome as with linear contracts, and the marginal incentives yi  Y 0(bi + i) =
C 0(bi) are also unchanged. The rent left to high types is now lower, however, implied by (B.8).
Under competition, bcH is given by (B.9). Now, for all b; w^(b
) w^(b)  B C^(b+)+C^(bH)
if and only if
B   [w^(b)  w^(b)] 
h
C^(bH +)  C(b)
i
 
h
C^(b)  C(b)
i
()
B   1  
2
2
(b  b)2  1  
2
2
(b+   b)2   1  
2
2
(b  b)2 + (B   A) ()
2A
1  2   [2(b  b
) + ] + (b  b)2 = (b  b +)2
Therefore (B.9) becomes
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bcH = b
 +max
(
0;  +
s
2A
1  2
)
(B.17)
or, in terms of marginal incentives, ycH = y
+max

0; ! +p2!A	 : Comparing these expressions
to (A.8), its is clear that competition leads to less distortion when nonlinear contracts are allowed
(possibly none, for low A), whereas the monopsony distortion remains the same. Nonetheless, when
A is high enough, or  small enough, competition can still be e¢ ciency-reducing:
Proposition 18 Let C(a; b) = a2=2 + b2=2 + ab: When employers can o¤er arbitrary nonlinear
contracts, social welfare is lower under competition than under monopsony if and only if qL is high
enough and
1 + qH
2qL
<


1  2

A


: (B.18)
Proof. We have
Lm =
qL (b
   bmL )2
2(1  2) <
qH (b
c
H   b)2
2(1  2) = L
c ()r
qL
qH
qH
qL
 <
s
2A
1  2   () M^(qL) 
1
2

1 +
r
qH
qL
2
<

1  2
A

:
Thus, together with the interim-e¢ ciency condition, which remains unchanged, we require:
M^(qL)  1
2

1 +
r
1  qL
qL
2
<

1  2
A

 1
2

qL
1  qL
2
+
qL
1  qL 
M(qL): (B.19)
While the upper bound M(qL) is unchanged from (A.12), the lower bound is higher than in the
linear-contracts case: it is easily veried thatM(qL) < M^(qL) for all qL  1: Nonetheless, it remains
the case that:
(i) M^(qL) < M(qL) for all qH=qL < :85; so for any qL > 0:55 (B.19) denes a nonempty range
for (A=)

=(1  2) :
(ii) As qL ! 1; M^(qL)! 1=2 and M(qL)! +1 so arbitrary large values of (A=)

=(1  2)
become feasible, including arbitrarily large A or arbitrarily low : In particular, imposing A <
B(1  2)  qH=qL to ensure 0 < y < ymL is never a problem for qL large enough. 
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Appendix C: Main Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Only the comparative-statics results remains to prove. First, di¤eren-
tiating (15) and (17) with respect to  yields
@ymL
@
=
qH
qL
1
wyy(ymL )
< 0 < qH
wy(y
m
L )
 wyy(ymL )
=
@Lm
@
: (C.1)
Turning next to A and using (10); we have
@ymL
@A
=
wyA(y
m
L )
 wyy(ymL )
=
a0(ymL )
 wyy(ymL )
< 0 (C.2)
1
qL
@Lm
@A
= wA(y
;A;B)  wA(ymL ;A;B) + wy(y;A;B)
@y
@A
  wy(ymL ;A;B)
@ymL
@A
= a(y)  a(ymL ) 
qH
qL

@ymL
@A
; (C.3)
showing clearly the two opposing e¤ects discussed in the text, and which exactly cancel out in the
quadratic-cost case (see (A.5)). Similarly, for B :
@ymL
@B
=
wyB(y
m
L )
 wyy(ymL )
=
b0(ymL )
 wyy(ymL )
> 0 (C.4)
1
qL
@Lm
@B
= wB(y
;A;B)  wB(ymL ;A;B) + wy(y;A;B)
@y
@B
  wy(ymL ;A;B)
@ymL
@B
= b(y)  b(ymL ) 
qH
qL

@ymL
@B
; (C.5)
showing again two o¤setting e¤ects on Lm: 
Proof of Lemma 1. Denote U cL and U
c
H the two typesutilities in the LCS allocation, and recall
that the former takes the same value as under symmetric information.
Claim 1 The LCS allocation is interim e¢ cient if and only if it solves the following program
(P) : max
(UL;UH ;yH ;yL)
fUHg; subject to:
UL  U cL = w(y) + LB (C.6)
UL  UH   yH (C.7)
UH  UL + yL (C.8)
0  P
i=H;L
qi [w(yi) +Bi   Ui] ; (C.9)
Proof. Conditions (C.7) and (C.8) are the incentive constraints for types L and H respectively,
and condition (C.9) the employersinterim break-even constraint. Now, note that:
(i) If the LCS allocation does not achieve the optimum, interim e¢ ciency clearly fails.
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(ii) If the LCS allocation solves (P); there can clearly be no incentive-compatible Pareto im-
provement in which UH > U cH ; but neither can there be one in which UH = U
c
H and UL > U
c
L:
Otherwise, note rst that one could without loss of generality take such an allocation, to satisfy
yH  y; otherwise, replacing yH by y while keeping UH and UL unchanged strictly increases
prots, so the LCS allocation remains (even more) dominated. Starting from such an allocation
with yH  y; let us now reduce UL by some small  > 0 and increase UH by some small ", while
also increasing yH by ("+ ) = to leave (C.6) unchanged (while (C.7) is only strengthened). This
results in extra prots of qH [w0(yH) ("+ )   "] + qL; which is positive as long as
 >
qH [1  w0(yH)] "
qL + qHw0(yH)
:
Both types and the rm are now strictly better o¤ than in the LCS allocation, contradicting the
fact that it is a solution to (P):
To study interim e¢ ciency and prove Lemma 1, let us therefore analyze the solution(s) to (P):
First, condition (C.9) must be binding, otherwise UL and UH could be increased by the same small
amount without violating the other constraints. Second, (C.7) must also be binding, otherwise
solving (P) without that constraint and with (C.9) as an equality leads to yL = y = yH ; UL = U cL
and UH = w(y) + BH ; thus UH   UL = B; violating (C.7). Third, (C.8) now reduces to
yH  yL: Two cases can then arise:
(i) If (C.6) is binding, the triple (UL, UH , yH) is uniquely given by the same three equality
constraints as the LCS allocation, and thus coincides with it.
(ii) If (C.6) is not binding, the solution to (P) is the same as when that constraint is dropped.
Substituting (C.7) into (C.9), and both being equalities, we have UH = qi [w(yi) +Bi]+qLyH;
so (P) reduces to
max
yH ;yL
fqH [w(yH) + (qL=qH) yH ] + qLw(yL) jyH  yLg: (C.10)
For all x  0; dene the function ~y(x)  argmaxyfw(y)+xy g and let x   w0(B). On the interval
[0; x] the function ~y is given by w0(~y(x)) =  x; so it is strictly increasing up to ~y(x) = B; while
for x > x; ~y(x)  B: Furthermore, it is clear that ~y(x)  y with equality only at x = 0; so the
pair (yH = ~y(qL=qH); yL = y) is the solution to (C.10). It is then indeed the case that (C.6) is
non-binding, U cL = w(y
) +BL < UH   yH = UL; if and only if
w(y) +BL < qH [w(yH) +BH ] + qL [w(y) +BL]  qHyH;
with yH = ~y(qL=qH): Equivalently, H(qL=qH) > 0; where
H(x)  w(~y(x))  w(y) + [B   ~y(x)]: (C.11)
Note thatH(0) > 0 andH(x) < 0 for x  x; while on [0; x] we haveH 0(x) = [w0(~y(x)) ] ~y0(x) =
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(qL=qH   1)~y0(x) =  (=qH)~y0(x): Therefore, there exists a unique ~x 2 (0; x) such that (C.6) is
non-binding and the solution to (P) thus di¤ers from the LCS allocationif and only ifqL=qH <
~x: Equivalently, the LCS allocation is the unique solution to (P); and therefore interim e¢ cient, if
and only if qL=(1 qL)  ~x=  ~qL=(1 ~qL); hence the result. For small it is easily veried from
H(~x)  0 and w0(~y(x)) =  x (implying ~y0(x) =  1=w00(~y(x))) that  ~x2=w00(y)  2 (B   y);
so that ~qL  1  
p
; where 1= p 2w"(y) (y  B): 
Proof of Proposition 2. To complete the proof of Results (1) and (2), it just remains to show
that: (a) If the LCS allocation is interim e¢ cient, it is a competitive equilibrium; (b) It is then the
unique one. We shall also prove here that: (c) If the LCS allocation is not interim e¢ cient, there
exists no competitive equilibrium in pure strategies.
Claim 2 In any competitive equilibrium, the utilities (UL; UH) must satisfy
UL  U cL = USIL  w(y) + LB; (C.12)
UH  U cH  w(ycH) + HB; (C.13)
Proof. If UL < U cL; a rm could o¤er the single contract (y = y
; z = zcL   ") for " small,
attracting and making a prot " on type L (perhaps also attracting the more protable type H).
Similarly, if UH < U cH ; it could o¤er the incentive-compatible menu f(y; zcL   "); (ycH ; zcH   ")g
thereby attracting and making a prot " on type H (perhaps also attracting and making zero
prot on type L).
Claim 3 If an allocation Pareto dominates (in the interim-e¢ ciency sense) the least-cost separat-
ing one, it must involve a cross-subsidy from high to low types, meaning that
w(yH) +BH   UH > 0 > w(yL) +BL   UL; (C.14)
Proof. If UL  w(yL)+LB; then UL  U cL requires that yL = y and UL = w(yL)+LB = U cL:
Incentive-compatibility and Pareto-dominance then imply that UL + yH  UH > U cH = UL +
ycH; hence yH > y
c
H : This, in turn, leads to w(yH) + HB   UH < w(ycH) + HB   UH =
U cH  UH < 0; violating the break-even condition. Therefore, it must be that w(yL) +BL  UL <
0; meaning that low types get more than the total surplus they generate. For the employer to break
even, it must be that high types get strictly less, w(yH) +BH   UH > 0:
We are now ready to establish the properties (a)-(c) listed above, and thereby complete the
proof of Results (1) and (2) in Proposition 2.
(a) Suppose that the LCS allocation, dened by (18)-(22), is o¤ered by all rms. Could another
one come in and o¤er a di¤erent set of contracts, leading to new utilities (UL; UH) and a strictly
positive prot? First, note that we can without loss of generality assume that UL  U cL : if
UL < U
c
L and UH is indeed selected (with positive probability) by type H, then (U
c
L , UH) is
incentive-compatible. By o¤ering U cL to L types (via their symmetric-information allocation), the
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deviating rm does not alter its protability. Second, if UH < U cH , the deviating employer does
not attract type H; since it cannot make money on type L while providing UL  U cL, the deviation
is not protable. Finally, suppose that UL  U cL and UH  U cH . If at least one inequality is strict,
then interim e¢ ciency of the LCS allocation implies that the deviating rm loses money. If both
are equalities, let us specify (for instance) that both types workers, being indi¤erent, do not select
the deviating rm.
(b) By (C.12)-(C.13), in any equilibrium both types must be no worse o¤ than in the LCS allo-
cation, and similarly for the rm, which must make non-negative prots. If any of these inequalities
is strict there is Pareto dominance, so when the LCS allocation is interim e¢ cient, they must all
be equalities, giving the LCS allocation as the unique solution.
(c) Suppose now that LCS allocation is not interim e¢ cient. The contract that solves (P)
is then such that yH = ~y(x); yL = y; UL > U cL (equation (C.6) is not binding) and UH > U
c
H
(since the LCS does not solve (P)): A rm can then o¤er a contract with the same yH and yL
but reducing both UH and UL by the same small amount, resulting in positive prots; the LCS
allocation is thus not an equilibrium. Suppose now that some other allocation, with utilities UL
and UH , is an equilibrium. As seen in (b), it would have to Pareto-dominate the LCS allocation,
which by Claim 3 implies:
UL  UH   yH;
w(yH) +BH   UH > 0:
Consider now a deviating employer o¤ering a single contract, aimed at the high type: y0H = yH + "
and U 0H = UH + (")=2 < w(y
0
H) + BH : The low type does not take it up, as it would yield
U 0L = UL   (")=2: The high type clearly does, leading to a positive prot for the deviator.k
The only part of Proposition 2 remaining to prove are the comparative static results. Di¤eren-
tiating (22) and (24) with respect to  yields
@ycH
@
=
B   ycH
   wy(ycH ;A;B)
> 0;
@Lc
@
=  qHwy(ymH ;A;B)
@ycH
@
> 0: (C.15)
Turning next to A;
 @y
c
H
@A
= wA(y
;A;B)  wA(ycH ;A;B) + wy(y;A;B)
@y
@A
  wy(ycH ;A;B)
@ycH
@A
= a(y)  a(ycH)  wy(ycH ;A;B)
@ycH
@A
)
@ycH
@A
=
a(ycH)  a(y)
   wy(ycH ;A;B)
< 0 <  qH@y
c
H
@A
=
@Lc
@A
: (C.16)
Again there is a direct and an indirect e¤ect of A on Lc, but now the direct one always dominates.
For B; in contrast, the ambiguity remains
  @y
c
H
@B
= wB(y
;A;B)  wB(ycH ;A;B) + wy(y;A;B)
@y
@B
  wy(ycH ;A;B)
@ycH
@B
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= b(y)  b(ycH)  wy(ycH ;A;B)
@ycH
@B
)
@ycH
@B
=
 + b(ycH)  b(y)
   wy(ycH ;A;B)
> 0; (C.17)
1
qH
@Lc
@B
= 1  @y
c
H
@B
=
 wy(ycH ;A;B)  b(ycH) + b(y)
   wy(ycH ;A;B)
: (C.18)
In the quadratic case, Lc is independent of B and the last term thus equal to zero; see (A.9). 
Proof of Proposition 4. We solve for the symmetric equilibrium under the assumption that
market shares are always interior, and thus given by (31). In Appendix D we verify that individual
deviations to corner solutions (one rm grabbing the whole market for some worker type, or on the
contrary dropping them altogether) can indeed be excluded.
To characterize the symmetric solution to (32)-(35), we distinguish three regions.
Region I. Suppose rst that the low types individual rationality constraint is not binding,
UL > U; so that  = 0:
Lemma 3 If  = 0; then H = 0  L and yL = y  yH:
Proof. (i) If H = L = 0; then yH = yL = y by (38)-(39), so (33)-(34) imply that UH UL =
y: Next, from (36)-(37) we havemH mL = t mL = 0; whereasmH mL  B (UH UL) =
(B   y) > 0; a contradiction.
(ii) If H > 0 = L condition (39) implies w
0(yL) > 0; hence yL < y, and condition (38)
yH = y
: Moreover, (36)-(37) and H > L require that mH < t < mL. However,
mH  mL = w(y)  w(yL) + (B   yL) > 0;
a contradiction. We are thus left with H = 0 < L; which implies yL = y
 < yH by (38)-(39).
Let us now derive and characterize yH as a function of t: We can rewrite (38) as
tqHw
0(yH) =  L =  qL(mL   t): (C.19)
Summing (36)-(37) and recalling that mi  w(yi) + iB   Ui yields
UL + t = qH [w(yH) + HB   (UH   UL)] + qL [w(y) + LB]
= qH [w(yH) + HB   yH] + qL [w(y) + LB] ; (C.20)
where the second equality reects the fact that (34) is an equality, since L > 0: Therefore:
mL   t = w(y) + LB   UL   t
= w(y) + LB   qL [w(y) + LB]  qH [w(yH) + HB   yH]
= qH [w(y
)  w(yH)  (B   yH)] (C.21)
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Substituting into (C.19) yields
(yH ; t)  w(yH)  w(y) + (B   yH) + tw
0(yH)
qL
= 0: (C.22)
The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium value of yH over Region I, denoted y^IH(t):
Lemma 4 For any t  0 there exists a unique y^IH(t) 2 (y; B) to (C.22). It is strictly decreasing
in t; starting from the perfectly competitive value y^IH(0) = y
c
H :
Proof. The function (y; t) is strictly decreasing in y on [y; B); with (y) > 0 > (B);
hence existence and uniqueness. Strict monotonicity then follows from the fact that  is strictly
decreasing in t; while setting t = 0 in (C.22) shows that y^IH(0) must equal y
c
H ; dened in (22) as
the unique solution to
w(y)  w(ycH) = (B   ycH):
It only remains to verify that the solution y^IH(t) is consistent with the initial assumption that  = 0;
or equivalently UL > U: By (C.20), we have for all yH
UL + t = qH [w(yH) + HB   yH] + qL [w(y) + LB]
= w(y) + LB + qH [(B   yH) + w(yH)  w(y)] : 
For yH = y^IH(t); the corresponding value of UL is strictly above U if and only if  (t) > U + t;
where we dene for all t:
 (t)  w(y) + LB + qH
 
B   y^IH(t)

   w(y) + w(y^IH(t))

: (C.23)
Lemma 5 There exists a unique t1 > 0 such that  (t)  U + t if and only if t  t1: On [0; t1]; the
low types utility UL is strictly decreasing in t; reaching U at t1:
Proof. At t = 0 the bracketed term is zero by denition of y^IH(0) = y
c
H ; so  (0) = w(y
)+LB
> U by (16), which stated that a monopsonist hires both types, and limt!+1

 (t)  U   t =  1;
there exists at least one solution to  (t) = U + t: To show that it is unique and the monotonicity
of UL; we establish that,  0(t) < 1 for all t > 0: From (C.22) and (C.23), this means that
qH

   w0(y^H)
  w0(y^H)=qL
   w0(y^H)  tw00(y^H)=qL

< 1 ()
qH

   w0(y^H)
   w0(y^H)=qL <    w0(y^H)  tw00(y^H)=qL ()
qH

   w0(y^H)
   w0(y^H) < qL    w0(y^H)  tw00(y^H) ()
tw
00
(y^H) <

   w0(y^H)
 
qHw
0(y^H) + qL

where we abbreviated y^IH(t) as y^H : In the last expression, the rst bracketed term is always non-
negative, whereas in the second one y < y^H < y^cH implies that qHw
0(y^H) + qL > qHw0(y^cH) +
qL > 0, by (23).
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In summary, Region I consists of the interval [0; t1]; where t1 is uniquely dened by  (t1) =
t1 + U: Over that interval, yL = y while yH = y^IH(t) is strictly decreasing in t; and therefore so
is the high types relative rent, UH   UL = y^IH(t): The low types utility level UL need not be
declining, but its starts at a positive value and reaches U exactly at t1:
For t  t1; the constraint UL  U is binding. Recalling that HL must always equal zero,
we distinguish two subregions, depending on whether H = 0 (Region II) or L = 0 (Region III),
and show that these are two intervals, respectively [t1; t2] and [t2;+1), with t1 < t2: Thus, inside
Region II the low types incentive constraint is binding but not the high types (L > 0 = H for
t 2 (t1; t2)); whereas inside Region 2 it is the reverse (H > 0 = L for t > t2):
Region II. Consider rst the values of t where H = 0 < L: As before, this implies that
yL = y
 < yH and UH   UL = yH; or UH = U + yH since UL = U: Therefore:
L = qH(mH   t) = qH [w(yH) + HB   UH   t] = qH

w(yH) + HB   yH   U   t

: (C.24)
Substituting into condition (38), the latter becomes
 (yH ; t)  w(yH) + HB   yH   U   t+ tw
0(yH)

= 0: (C.25)
On the interval [y; B); the function  (y; t) is strictly decreasing in yH and t; with
 (y^IH(t); t)  w(y^H(t)) + HB   y^IH(t) +
tw0(y^IH(t))

  U   t
= w(y) + LB +

1  1
qL

tw0(yIH(t1))

  U   t
= w(y) +BL   t

1 +
qH
qL
w0(yH)


  U: (C.26)
At t = t1; substituting (C.22) into (C.23) yields  (y^IH(t1); t1) = 0: Furthermore, as t rises above t1;
y^IH(t) decreases, so w
0(y^IH(t)) increases. Since
qL + qHw
0(y^H(t)) > qL + qHw0(y^H(0)) = qL + qHw0(ycH) > 0
by (23), t

qL + qHw
0(y^IH(t))

is also increasing in t; implying that  (y^IH(t); t) is decreasing in t
and therefore negative over (t1;+1): Next, observe that  (y; t) = w(y)+H(B y)+Ly  U t:
Dene therefore
t2  w(y) + H(B   y) + Ly   U; (C.27)
and note that
t1 = w(y
) + LB + qH
 
B   y^IH(t1)

   w(y) + w(y^IH(t1))
  U
< w(y) + LB + qH
 
B   y^IH(t1)

   U
< w(y) + LB + 1  (B   y)   U = t2:
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Lemma 6 For all t 2 [t1; t2]; there exists a unique y^IIH (t) 2 [y; y^IH(t1))] such that  (y^IIH (t); t) = 0:
Furthermore, y^IIH (t) is strictly decreasing in t; starting at y^
II
H (t1) = y^(t1) and reaching y
 at t = t2:
For all t > t2;  (yH ; t) < 0 over all yH  y:
Proof. For t 2 [t1; t2] we have shown that  (y^H(t1); t)  0   (y; t); with the rst equality
strict except at t1 and the second one strict except at t2: Since  (y; t) is strictly decreasing in y
and t; the results follow. The fact that y^IIH (t) < y^
I
H(t) on (t1; t2] also means that if there is a kink
between the two curves at t1 it is a convex one, as shown in Figure III. And indeed, di¤erentiating
(C.22) and (C.25), we have    y^IH0 (t1) <    y^IIH 0 (t1) if and only if
   w
0
qL(   w0)  tw00 <
   w0
(   w0)  tw00 ) ()
 tw"
   w0 >  
 
qHw
0 + qL

:
with all derivatives evaluated at y^IH(t1) = y^
II
H (t1): Since y
 < y^IH(t1) < y
c
H the term on the left is
positive and that on the right negative.
As to t2; note that it is the only point where H = 0 = L (the only intersection of Regions II
and III). Indeed, this require yH = y = yL by (38)-(39) and condition (39) together with UL = U
then implies that t = mL = w(y) + LB   yL   U = t2:
Region II thus consists of the interval [t 1; t2]. Over that interval, yL = y while yH = y^IIH (t) is
strictly decreasing in t; and therefore so is the high types utility, UH = U + yH(t); while the
low types utility remains xed at UL = U: Furthermore, we can show.
Putting together Regions I and II, we shall dene:
y^H(t) =
(
y^IH(t) for t 2 [0; t1]
y^IIH (t) for t 2 [t1; t2]
: (C.28)
Region III. Inside this region, namely for t > t2; we have UL = U but now H > L = 0.
This implies that yH = y > yL by (38)-(39) and UH = U + yL by (33). Furthermore,
H = qH (t mH) = qH

t+ U + yL   w(y)  HB

Substituting into condition (39), the latter becomes
(yL; t)  qH

w(y) + HB   yL   U   t

+
tqLw
0(yL)

= 0: (C.29)
On the interval [0; y]; the function (y; t) is strictly decreasing in yL; with
(y; t) = qH

w(y) + HB   y   U   t

= qH (t2   t) < 0:
Recall now that the monopsony price ymL is uniquely dened by w
0(ymL ) = (qH=qL): Therefore:
(ymL ; t) = qH

w(y) + LB   U + (B   ymL)

> 0:
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Lemma 7 For all t  t2 there exists a unique y^L(t) such that (y^L(t); t) = 0; and ymL < y^L(t)  y;
with equality at t = t2: Furthermore, y^L(t) is strictly decreasing in t and limt!+1 y^L(t) = ymL :
Proof. Existence and uniqueness have been established. Next, @(y; t)=@t = qLw0(y)=   1:
At y = y^L(t); this equals 1=t times
 qH

w(y) + HB   yL   U   t
  t =  qLt  qH w(y) + HB   U   yL < 0;
so the function y^L(t) is strictly decreasing in t: Taking limits in (C.29) as t ! +1; nally, yields
as the unique solution limt!+1 y^L(t) = ymL :
Proof of Proposition 6. The fact that @UL=@t < 0 over Region I was shown in Lemma 5. To
show the last result, note that over Region III, we have
2 = qH [w(y
) + HB   y^L] + qL[w(y^L) + LB]  U )
1
qL
@
@y^L
= w0(y^L)  qH
qL
 > w0(y^mL ) 
qH
qL
 = 0;
so prots fall as t declines, as was shown to be the case over Regions I and II. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider rst total pay. Since zi = Ui   u(yi)   iyi; we can write
Yi = Ui + b(yi)yi   u(yi); for i = H;L: As t declines, Ui and yi increase (at least weakly) and
therefore so does Yi; since u0(y) = b: Furthermore,
YH   YL = UH   UL + b(yH)yH   u(yH) + u(yL)  b(yL)yL:
Over Regions I and II this becomes [ + b(yH)] yH u(yH) plus a constant term, with yH = y^H(t);
the result then follow from u0(y) = b: Over Region III, YH   YL = [   b(yL)] yL + u(yL) plus a
constant term, with yL = y^L(t); therefore, @(YH   YL)=@t < 0 if and only if b0(yL)yL < ; which
need not hold in general. With quadratic costs, b0(yL) = 1=(1  2) so it holds on [t2;+1) if and
only if y = B   A < (1  2): Turning now to performance-based pay, we have
@([b(yH) + H ] yH   [b(yL) + L] yL)
@t
=

b(yH) + H + yHb
0(yH)
 @yH
@t
 b(yL) + L + yLb0(yL) @yL
@t
:
In Regions I and II the rst term is negative and the second zero; in Region III it is the reverse.
Turning nally to xed wages, zH   zL = UH  UL  HyH + LyL u(yH)+u(yL). In Regions
I and II, zH   zL =  L(yH   y)   u(yH) + u(y) is decreasing in yH ; hence increasing in t: In
Region III, zH   zL = (yL   y) H   u(y) + u(yL); so the opposite holds. 
Proof of Proposition 8. For any y 2 [0; ycH); let y  minfy; yg: A rm can always o¤er low
types their constrained symmetric-information allocation yL = y; L = 0 and w(y)+BL  USIL ;
so in equilibrium they must receive at least that much. Consider therefore the relaxed program
(from which high typesincentive-compatibility constraint has been omitted):
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(Pr) : max
f(Ui;0yiy; 0i)gi=H;L
fUHg; subject to:
UL  USIL () (C.30)
UL  UH   yH   H (L) (C.31)
0  P
i=H;L
qi[w(yi) +Bi   (1  i)i   Ui]; () (C.32)
The rst-order conditions in UH and UL are respectively 1  L   qH = 0 and L +    qL = 0;
thus  = 1 +  > 0; (C.32) so that must bind, and L = qL(1 + )   : The rst-order conditions
in yH and H then take the form
(1 + )

qL + qHw
0(yH)
    0; with equality unless yH = y; (C.33)
(1 + ) [qL  qH(1  H)]    0; with equality unless H = 0: (C.34)
 Case 1. Suppose that (41) does not hold: qL  qH(1   H): If this is strict, or if it is an
equality and  > 0; (C.34) requires that H = 0: In the (measure-zero) case where it is an equality
and  = 0; the rm is indi¤erent and we shall break the indi¤erence by assuming that it still does
not use the ine¢ cient currency. Replacing H = 0 into (C.31) and the binding (C.32), we obtain
UL  qH [w(yH) +BH ] + qL [w(y) +BL]  qHyH )
UL   USIL  qH [w(yH) + (B   yH)   w(y)] : (C.35)
Let us rst show that yH = y: Otherwise, (C.33) implies that =(1+) = qL+qHw0(yH)= > 0
(by (23)), so UL = USIL ; meanwhile, L  0 requires =(1 + )  qL; so yH  y: But then y = y
and in (C.35) the right-hand side is strictly positive (as yH 2 (y; ycH)); contradicting UL = USIL :
Next, with yH = y; the right-hand side of (C.35) equals qH(B   y) if y  y and qH [w(y) +
(B   y)   w(y)] if y < y: Thus in both cases UL > USIL ; implying  = 0 and L > 0: From
(C.33) it follows that (C.31) and (C.35) are equalities, with yH = y; the latter shows that low
types receive a cross-subsidy which increases as y declines to y; then remains constant. This
allocation is the one described in Proposition 8-(1), and since UH   UL = y  y; it satises
the (omitted) high types incentive constraint. It is separating for y > y and pooling for y  y;
since (yH ; H) = (yL; L) = (y; 0) and UH   UL = y; implying zH = zL: As it solves the
relaxed problem it is interim e¢ cient and therefore (by standard arguments) the unique equilibrium.
Finally, UH = w(y) +BH and UL = w(y)  y +BL both increase as y declines to y:
 Case 2. When (41) holds, (C.30) must bind, otherwise  = 0 and (C.34) fails. From (C.31) and
the binding (C.32) we have UH = w(yH) +BH   (1  H)H  USIL + yH + H, so
(1  L)H  (B   yH) + w(yH)  w(y) > 0 (C.36)
since yH  y < ycH : With H > 0; (C.34) must be an equality, which yields =(1 + ) = qL  
qH(1   H)= > 0 and L=(1 + ) = qL   =(1 + ) > 0: Thus (C.31) is binding, (C.36) holds
with equality, and the left-hand side of (C.33) becomes (1 + )qH [w0(yH) + (1  H)=] > 0;
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by (40); therefore yH = y: By (C.36), H = [(B   y) + w(y)   w(y)]=(1   L) is then strictly
increasing as y decreases from ycH to 0: Since UH   UL = y + H > yL; the high types
omitted incentive constraint is also satised. The solution to the relaxed program thus coincides
with the constrained-LCS allocation described in Proposition 8-(2), which is thus interim e¢ cient
and therefore, the unique equilibrium.
Finally, consider how welfare varies with y: Prots always equal zero and low types always
receive USIL ; which is increasing in y below y; then constant. As to high types, they achieve
UH = w(y) +BH  

1  H
1  L

[(B   y) + w(y)  w(y)]: (C.37)
As a function of y, the right-hand side is strictly concave on [y; ycH ]; with a derivative that is
negative below ycH (by (40)). Therefore, UH is strictly increasing in y and maximized at y
c
H ; where
the constraint ceases to bind. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Given (42), the cap Y does not constrain low types from receiving
their full symmetric-equilbrium allocation, USIL = w(y
)+BL:We look for a zero-prot, least-cost
separating allocation, now satisfying
(yH) +BH + yHb(yH) = Y + H ; (C.38)
UH   yH   H = USIL : (C.39)
The rst condition implies that
UH = w(yH) +BH   (1  H)H = u(yH)  yHb(yH) + Y + HH ; (C.40)
and the second thus becomes
USIL = u(yH)  yHb(yH) + Y + LH   yH: (C.41)
Adding (C.38) to this last equation and substituting in USIL yields
w(y) +BL + Y + H = w(yH) +BH   yH + Y + LH ()
w(y)  w(yH) = (B   yH)   (1  L)H
= (B   yH)   (1  L)

(yH) + yHb(yH) +BH   Y
 ()
w(y) = w(yH) + (B   yH)   (1  L)

Aa(yH) +Bb(yH) +BH   Y

;
where the next-to-last equation uses (C.38) to substitute for H and the last one follows from
the denition of : Denoting &(yH) the right-hand side of this last equation, (10) implies that
& 0(yH) = w0(yH)  (1  L) [w0(yH) + yHb0(yH)]  < 0 for yH  y; while (22) and (42) ensure
that &(y) > w(y)  &(ycH): Therefore, the equation has a unique solution yrH 2 (yycH ]; which is
easily seen to be increasing in Y :
The next step consists once again in checking whether this allocation is interim e¢ cient, and
thus the equilibrium outcome. Consider therefore the following (relaxed) program:
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(Pr) : max
f(Ui; yi; i)gi=H;L
fUHg; subject to:
UL  USIL () (C.42)
UL  UH   yH   H (L) (C.43)
UH  u(yH)  yHb(yH) + Y + HH () (C.44)
0  P
i=H;L
qi[w(yi) + iB   (1  i)i   Ui]; () (C.45)
For the LCS allocation not to be interim e¢ cient, the optimum must have UL > USIL ; hence  = 0:
Solving the rst-order conditions in UL and UH then yields L = qL and  = 1 L qH = 1 :
Furthermore, the rst-order condition with respect to H is
H(1  ) + qL   qH(1  H)  0;
which is ruled out by (41). Thus, interim e¢ ciency obtains.
Finally, let us examine how UH varies with Y : Equations (C.39) and (C.40) imply that
dUH = dyH +dH = w
0(yH)dyH   (1  H)dH
)  (1  L)dH =

   w0(yH)

dyH
We saw earlier that yH is increasing in Y , and thus naturally H is increasing, as rms substitute
toward the ine¢ cient currency. Substituting for dH into the rst equation, we have:
@UH
@ Y
=

w0(yH)

+
1  H



1  L

@yH
@ Y
> 0; (C.46)
by (40). Therefore, as Y is reduced, UH decreases. Since low typesutility is una¤ected and prots
remain equal to zero, the result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 10. Let us adopt the convention that z and y are net compensations.
In particular, y is still the e¤ective power of the incentive scheme. Prot on type i = H;L under
contract (y; z) is then
i = Aa(y) +B[i + b(y)]  z + y[i + b(y)]
1   ; (C.47)
while the expression for Ui is unchanged. Furthermore,
Ui + (1  )i = (1  ) [Aa(y) +B(i + b(y))]  [C(a(y); b(y))  va(y)]
 bw(y) + (1  )Bi: (C.48)
Let y()  y be the bilaterally e¢ cient power of incentives: y() = argmaxf bw(y)g: The LCS
equilibrium has yL = y() and yH given by
bw(y())  bw(yH) =  [(1  )B   yH ]
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Welfare W is equal to qHw(yH) + qLw(yL) +B, and so
dW
d
j=0 = qLw0(yL)dy

d
+ qHw
0(yH)
dyH
d
= qHw
0(yH)
dyH
d
: (C.49)
Finally, for small  ;
bw0(yH) = w0(yH)   d
dyH
[Aa(yH) +Bb(yH)] = w
0(yH) + o())
dW
d
j=0 =   B
   w0(yH)qHw
0(yH) > 0:  (C.50)
Lemma 8 The rst-best solution dened by (45) satises yA < A and yB < B:
Proof. The rst-order conditions (45) take the form
(A  yA)(@a=@yA) + (B   yB)  @b=@yA = ryA2A;
(A  yA)(@a=@yB) + (B   yB)  @b=@yB = ryB2B;
with all derivatives evaluated at (yA; yB): Let D  (@a=@yA)  @b=@yB   (@a=@yB)  @b=@yA ;
which is easily seen to equal 1=[CaaCbb   (Cab)2] > 0 (this holds for any (yA; yB)): We then have
A  yA = 1
D

(@b=@yB)
 
ryA2A=2
  (@b=@yA)  ryB2B=2 > 0;
B   yB = 1
D

(@a=@yA)
 
ryB2B=2
  (@a=@yB)  ryA2A=2 > 0;
hence the result.
Proof of Lemma 2. The LCS allocation is interim e¢ cient if and only if it solves the relaxed
program
maxf(Ui; yi)gi=H;LfUHg; subject to
UL  UH   yAHA   yBHB;P
i=H;L
qi [w(yi) +Di   Ui]  0;
UL  USIL :
The solution to this program must satisfy yL = y. If the LCS allocation is not interim e¢ cient, the
solution must be such that UL > USIL , implying  = 0. Using the zero-prot condition, substituting
UL, using the incentive-compatibility condition and taking derivatives yields:
1
A
@w(yH)
@yAH
=
1
B
@w(yH)
@yBH
=   qL
qH
: (C.51)
Letting  denote the subsidyfrom the H- to the L-type, the above program can be rewritten as:
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(Pr) : maxfUHg; subject to
UH  w(yH) +DH   qLqH 
USIL +   UH   yH 
  0
where yH  denotes the scalar product of yH 
 
yAH ; y
B
H

and    A;B. Note rst that
the rst two constraints must both be binding. Indeed, denoting i the Lagrange multiplier on the i-
th constraint, the rst-order conditions are 1 1 2 = 0 for UH ; 1rw(yH)+2 = 0 for yH and
3 1qL=qH+2 = 0 for : The rst two clearly exclude 1 = 0: If 2 = 0; then yH = y and 3 > 0;
implying  = 0; but then the second constraint becomes w(y)+DL = USIL  w(y)+DH y ;
hence 0  DH  DL   y  = (A  yA)A + (B   yB)B; a contradiction of Lemma 8.
Next, eliminating  from the binding constraints shows that yH solves maxfw(yH)+ `  yHg;
where `  qL=qH 2 (0;1) is the likelihood ratio. Consider any two such ratios ` and ^` and the
corresponding optima yH and byH for this last program; if ^`> `, then
w(yH)  w(y^H) + `  (y^H   yH) ;
w(y^H)  w(yH) + ^`  (yH   y^H) :
Adding up these inequalities yields   (y^H   yH)  0, which in turn implies that w(yH) 
w(y^H): Observe now from (48) that the LCS allocation corresponds to an interior solution to
maxfw(yH) + c  yHg: Consider now any ` > c and the corresponding solution yH . We have
w(yH)  w (ycH) and so
w(yH) +DH   `  w (ycH) +DH = U cH ;
with strict inequality if  > 0: This last case is impossible, however, since type Hs utility from the
relaxed program cannot be lower than U cH . Therefore,  = 0 and yH = y
c
H : the LCS allocation is
interim e¢ cient. Conversely, let ` < c; we then have (as a row-vector equality)
@
@yH
[w(yH) + `  yH ]yH=ycH = (l   
c);
with A  0 and B > 0: Since yH maximizes (each component of) the expression in brackets,
it must be that yAH  yAcH and yBH < yAcH ; hence   (ycH   yH) > 0: By the same properties shown
above, it follows that w(yH) > w(ycH): If  = 0; the two binding constraints in (Pr) then imply
UH = U
SI
L + yH  < USIL + ycH  = U cH ;
UH = w(yH) +DH > w(y
c
H) +DH = U
c
H ;
another contradiction. Therefore  must be positive after all, and interim e¢ ciency fails. 
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